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ABSTRACT
This doctoral dissertation provides a framework for analyzing consumer’s demand
and firm’s pricing strategy under a dynamic setting. The results bring new methods
and empirical evidence to the existing literature within this realm.
The first chapter evaluates retailers choice of service even when service is not ob-
served. Retailer optimization over service alters manufacturers price setting and thus
provides the required identification. Using new data containing wholesale prices from
China’s second largest wireless carrier, I construct and estimate a dynamic structural
model including both demand and supply. I find that service has a significantly pos-
itive effect on expanding market demand; however, its impact subsides over time. I
argue that this pattern provides a potential explanation for Apple’s initial exclusive
contract with China Unicom and subsequent contract arrangements.
The second chapter is a joint work with Gautam Gowrisankaran and Marc Rys-
man. We develop and implement a new method for calculating price-cost margins
in a durable goods environment. We study the industry of digital camcorders and
analyze how margins differ across products, firms and time. We are particularly in-
terested in the extent to which falling marginal costs explain falling prices. Using
demand estimates and our new method, we generate non-parametric distributions of
vi
marginal costs that each firm expects for each product. We show that marginal cost
falls dramatically by an average of $300 and that the price-cost margin is strongly
correlated with quality. We also find that the market share is an important driver for
the dynamic effects in our model.
The last chapter investigates firm’s price adjustment processes, with a particular
focus on the micro-level determinants of the frequency of price changes. Using the
same data as in the first chapter, I construct and estimate a model of the frequency
of price adjustments within products. I find that the price of a high quality product
tends to adjust more often. Older products are more likely to change price than newer
ones. Also, firms are more responsive to seasonal effects than to market competition.
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CHAPTER ONE
1.1 Introduction
This paper provides a framework for learning about the role of retailer service when
service is not observed. “Service” in this paper relates to any type of non-contractible
brand level promotion choice made by the retailer. For instance, a sales person taking
time to explain the features of a complex product is an important example of service
for this paper. Given limited access to service data, this paper draws its inference
about service through the manufacturer’s first-order condition. Even if the retailer
bears the full cost of service provision, nonetheless, the retailer’s optimization of ser-
vice enters the manufacturer’s first-order condition. As a result, variation in wholesale
prices provides a source of identification of the importance of service. Taking advan-
tage of the observed wholesale prices in the data, I am able to numerically estimate
the impact of service. I proceed with the estimation in two steps. First, I construct
and estimate a dynamic structural demand model featuring heterogeneous consumer
preferences. In the second step, given the estimates of the demand model, I compute
the manufacturer’s price-cost margins, as a function of parameters governing service
provision. Matching the predicted price-cost margin to the observed price-cost margin
allows me to estimate how consumers respond to service. The empirical focus is on
the service provided by China Unicom, the second-largest wireless carrier in China,
which was under an exclusive contract with Apple from 2010 to 2012.
Learning about service is necessary for many reasons. First, a consumer’s purchase
decision is subject to service. For example, a well-designed display center can change
consumer’s perception of a product; pre-purchase demonstration helps consumers to
better infer the quality and performance of the product; and post-purchase service can
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be viewed as a quality improvement. Consumer’s welfare is improving with service.
As service increases, the probability of purchase and thus the firm’s revenue are also
higher. Therefore, learning about service is of policy relevance for surplus calculations
in the counterfactuals. Second, service affects the demand faced by both the retailer
and the manufacturer. Service is often subjected to free-riding, and thus provides
useful information for assessments of merger activities between manufacturer and
retailer, as well as across retailers. Finally, as the empirical setting happens to be an
exclusive contract, service estimations can help us better understand the underlying
motivations for such vertical contracts.
Estimation of service has been quite challenging for economists. One reason is
the heterogeneous preferences regarding service by infra-marginal consumers (Spence
(1975)). Another reason is that service is difficult to measure. Limited data access
furthers the difficulty. This paper addresses these issues by specifying a model in
which a retailer picks the optimal level of service and manufacturers respond ap-
propriately in picking wholesale price. After knowing the mechanism of service on
wholesale prices, I need only focus on the variation of wholesale prices to infer service.
This paper’s contribution to the existing literature is four-fold. First, it brings
new empirical evidence to the literature on the inference of service, in particular
those that focus on service as a purpose for various vertical constraints. Restrained
by limited access to service data, most research is theoretical. This paper, to my
knowledge, is the first attempt to empirically evaluate the impact of service. The
results in turn bring insights and clarifications to policy-makers and inspire better
judgments when it comes to cases of vertical constraints in the future. The second
contribution is that I present a new method for learning about service from supply
chain first-order conditions. This method is not limited to the analysis of service,
but can be widely applied to the identification of any variable that is unobservable
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but nonetheless alters a firm’s first-order condition. In a closely related paper by
?, she uses supply chain first-order conditions to infer vertical relationships between
manufacturer and retailer. The third contribution is the novelty of data. The data
was obtained directly from the industry source – China Unicom – and provides the
wholesale prices of smartphone models charged by the manufacturer to China Unicom,
a rare opportunity in empirical studies. Besides its use for service estimation, the data
also help to expand our understandings of the similarities and differences in wireless
industries in China and the United States. The last contribution is that showing that
service is important provides a potential explanation for why Apple signs exclusive
contracts, which I will further discuss below.
As mentioned, a great challenge and also the main contribution of this paper is
to empirically identify the effect of service. The identification strategy is inspired
by Bresnahan (1989), who argues that the logical distinction between two theoretical
models will yield different comparative statics given a change in an exogenous variable,
and the distinction in the comparative statics serves as economics inference that
guides us in seeking identification of the model from data. In my case, service enters
the consumer’s utility function the same way as other demand shocks, causing a
shift of demand. As service is unobserved, we cannot uniquely pin down the cause
when we see a demand shift. However, I can estimate service from the supply chain.
After plugging in the retailer’s optimal choice of service from the retailer’s first-order
condition, the manufacturer’s first-order condition specifies a relationship between
wholesale price, marginal cost, elasticities and market share, where elasticities are a
function of service parameters. There would be a different relationship between these
variables if service plays no roles. The data favor the former relationship, so I can
estimate service by finding the parameters that rationalize this relationship.
Showing that service matters is important also because it provides a potential
3
explanation for Apple’s pattern of exclusive contract. Under the concept of service,
there are several implications. First, service increases demand. Service provides
extra product information for consumers who are less familiar with the product; it
can also change consumers’ perceptions of a product’s quality, for example, by having
a well-designed product showing center. Either way, it increases the probability that
a consumer will make a purchase. Second, because a rival retailer can steal market
share from the retailer who provides service by simply lowering prices, it reduces the
incentive for retailers to provide service. Finally, service being unobservable gives rise
to vertical externality, such that the retailer will provide service that is less than the
manufacturer’s ideal level if the retailer cannot share the profit increase from service
provision.
Exclusive contract can be an efficient tool for enforcement and motivation to pro-
vide service in this setting. Under an exclusive contract, a retailer has the total
market share to itself. Based on the first implication, a higher market share provides
more incentive for retailers to provide service. Also, an exclusive contract eliminates
the service free-riding problem as consumers can only purchase the product from the
retailer that provides the service. Further, if service is no longer important after a
product becomes well-known, this can potentially explain Apple’s consecutive con-
tract arrangements: an exclusive contract for the initial move followed by agreements
with more retailers when the iPhone had gained enough familiarity. A closely related
paper by Sinkinson (2014) studies the same type of exclusive contract between Ap-
ple and AT&T, however, provides a different motivation for exclusive contracting. I
argue that an exclusive contract could be motivated by the manufacturer’s need to
induce the retailer to provide optimal service; he argues that an exclusive contract
can generate higher prices. Therefore, he focuses more on Apple wanting an exclusive
contract and choosing a carrier, while my research assumes Apple already has chosen
4
a carrier and investigates how the service level will vary under the exclusive contract.
The empirical model in this paper is motivated by several theoretical papers that
study the enforcement of service. The one that had the most influence is the paper
by Perry & Porter (1990) in which they use a representative consumer model and test
which combination of vertical constraints will generate the optimal level of service.
A different paper by Mathewson & Winter (1984) addresses similar question using
a spatial model. They argue that the less optimal service is generated by two types
of externality: one is horizontal externality and the other is vertical externality, in
which the retailer fails to account for the profit increase for the manufacturer from
the service provision. Perry and Porter’s (1990) work is more fitting for my model in
the sense that the effect of service is market share dependent such that the marginal
contribution of service to sales is higher when market share is higher. My model,
however, differs from Perry and Porter’s model; I do not tackle the issue of retailer
entry and exit since I have only one retailer, while it plays a heavy role in their
paper. The one-retailer setting automatically captures the implication of exclusive
territory, specifically, an increase in equilibrium prices and manufacturers’ profits by
altering the perceived demand curve to a less elastic one.1. In this sense, my model
is a combination of Perry & Porter (1990) and Rey & Stiglitz (1995).
The empirical model I use for demand estimation follows Gowrisankaran & Rys-
man (2012), in which consumers are forward-looking and their choice of purchases is
affected by their various traits, including area of residence, educational achievement,
age and other demographics. Dynamics play an essential role here, especially for the
smartphone market. The durability and rapid evolution of the market creates sub-
stantial intertemporal substitutions, requiring consumers to think ahead when they
1This is the key argument in Rey & Stiglitz (1995) that by this an exclusive territory can be used
for reducing interbrand competition
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make a purchase. Unlike Gowrisankaran & Rysman (2012), here I allow for only a
single purchase, while they allow repurchase behavior. Repurchasing is a reality in
that consumers will replace their old smartphones with new ones after several years of
use, however, such behavior is not captured by the data because the data ends before
or around the time when replacements take place. Another point worth noticing is
the price that consumers pay, which is not a one-time payment but a set of consecu-
tive payments throughout the contract. Thus, the price used in the estimation is the
discounted sum of the bundle price and consecutive monthly access fees.
In addition to Sinkinson (2014), a number of recent papers (Villas-Boas (2007),
Mortimer (2008), Lafontaine & Slade (2008), Zanarone (2009), Asker & Ljungqvist
(2010), Bonnet & Dubois (2010) and Bonnet & Dubois (2013),Conlon & Mortimer
(2014)) conduct empirical evaluations of vertical constraints. Lafontaine & Slade
(2008) conduct a survey on recent developments in empirical assessments of vertical
relationships, and divide the literature into groups based on the econometric ap-
proach, such as multivariate regression on a cross-section level, natural experiments
on legal changes, firm’s value forecast in an event study and estimating a structural
model. My paper falls into the last category. Also in the same category are papers by
Villas-Boas (2007), Bonnet & Dubois (2010) and Bonnet & Dubois (2013), which de-
rive analytical expressions of a firm’s first-order condition, and use those expressions
to conduct comparisons between vertical relationship alternatives and select the one
that fits the data the best. While these papers share similarities with mine in the
mathematical derivations, they differ from my own in two important respects. First,
mine accommodates the service factor, while theirs do not. Second, my focus is on
detecting the impact of service on a firm’s price scheme, while theirs is on detecting
which pricing scheme best fits the data. Mortimer (2008) and Conlon & Mortimer
(2014) study the effect of vertical rebates on downstream retailer’s service, so is more
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relevant to my paper than others in this regard. However, the service in my paper
focuses on types of services that are difficult to verify and are of a broader defini-
tion, whereas the service in their paper is specifically about the retailer’s effort in
restocking goods.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents and describes data,
Section 3 constructs a simple theoretical model serivce, Section 4 constructs the em-
pirical model for both demand and supply, Section 5 discusses the estimation method
and inference, Section 5 presents the empirical results and Section 6 presents the
conclusions.
1.2 Industry Description and Data
1.2.1 Background of Chinese Wireless Industry
The iPhone entered the Chinese market in November 2009, exclusively sold through
China Unicom at the time. China Unicom did not officially introduce the
phone+network bundle until August 2010, so the iPhone was the only product that
could be either purchased as a non-contracted phone or through a bundle contract
during this time. The phone+network bundle was relatively new in China at the
time of this data, and China Unicom was a pioneer in initiating bundle sales. The
other carriers did not adopt the bundle sales model until March 2010. Although it
was widely adopted by carriers, a great portion of the population chose to purchase
a non-contracted phone separately from a phone retailer, and then subscribe only to
network service through a carrier before and during the data period. At the end of the
period covered by this data, 70% of the population was still choosing a non-contracted
phone over a bundle from a wireless carrier.
Figure 1.1 and 1.2 show the market division among three carriers in both 2G and
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3G networks over time. At the end of 2009, there were 726 million mobile phone
users total, among which only 1.7% were 3G network users. China Mobile was in
a dominant position in both 2G and 3G networks, taking up to 73% of market
shares in 2G network and 45% in 3G network; China Telecom was the smallest
carrier in 2G network with only 7.3% market shares; and China Unicom started
as the smallest 3G carrier with 22% of total 3G market shares. By the end of
May 2013, just over three years later, 3G network users had expanded to almost
400 million, representing 33% of mobile users. Market shares have become more
balanced among carriers, with China Mobile, China Telecom and China Unicom
each having 41%, 28% and 31% shares of the whole market. China Unicom has
surpassed China Telecom and become the second largest 3G wireless carrier in China.
Figure 1.1: Market Shares of Three Carriers in 2009
1.2.2 Data
The dataset I use in this estimation consists of sales and demographic data. A
“product” here is a “phone+network” bundle from China Unicom, where a consumer
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Figure 1.2: Market Shares of Three Carriers in 2013
signs a contract with the carrier for a certain length of time and picks a data plan
for network service in exchange for a discounted phone price. Carriers also offer the
option of a non-contract phone, which is the same deal a consumer would receive
from a phone retailer. In this case, the consumer is not subjected to a contract.
Given the huge share of the population with a mobile phone, the market is defined
as the consumers that prefer to purchase a phone from a wireless carrier rather than
a regular phone retailer, and the outside option includes consumers who purchase a
non-contract phone from a carrier (not necessary from China Unicom) and those who
purchase a bundle from a rival carrier to China Unicom.
A novelty of this data is that wholesale prices are observable, which is a rare op-
portunity for empirical economists. Observing wholesale price is essential here. As
I mentioned earlier in the introduction, I cannot estimate service without wholesale
price. However, the data comes with a limitation: the sales-related information is
available for only one carrier, China Unicom. Such a limitation makes it quite dif-
ficult to conduct analysis on carriers’ behaviors, nonetheless, the data is reasonably
sufficient to study the behaviors of manufacturers, as Unicom carries models of up to
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21 various brands.
Table 1.1: Bundle Summary Statistics
Obs. : 833
Statistic Units Mean Std. Min Max
Bundles
List price RMB 1, 971 1, 434 499 5, 880
Monthly fee RMB 33 17 0 92
Total price RMB 2, 646 1, 406 1, 181 6, 795
Sales 46, 720 64, 498 158 609, 000
Phones
Retail price RMB 1, 665 1, 380.9 399 5, 399
Wholesale price RMB 1, 500.8 1, 207.5 330 5, 280
Camera Mps 397 190.8 130 1, 300
Screen size Inches 3.55 0.63 2 7
Battery life mAh 1, 446.3 339.1 860 4, 000
CPU MHz 832 322.6 184 1, 741
Dual-SIMs-dual-standby 0.42 0.49 0 1
Imported 0.46 0.50 0 1
Operating systems
Android 0.67 0.47 0 1
iOS 0.09 0.29 0 1
Symbian 0.06 0.24 0 1
Windows 0.03 0.17 0 1
Others 0.15 0.35 0 1
Notes: An observation is a model-service-month bundle. Market shares are defined as quantity sold divided
by market size, with market size defined as the number of mobile phone users at the end of May 2013.
The sales data contain market-level sales-related information from August 2010
to May 2013, collected directly from China Unicom. A “phone+network” bundle is
an observation unit, including general information such as quantity sold and bundle
list price. Detailed information includes the characteristics and wholesale price of the
smartphone that comes with the bundle. Also, for each bundle, the data specifies the
contract length and a list of 11 various plan options, which together determine the
level of monthly refund. Therefore, the total price a consumer has to pay is an upfront
payment of the bundle list price plus the discounted sum of a series of consecutive
payments, which is equal to the plan fee net the refund. The plan fee ranges from
66RMB to 866RMB per month. A more expensive data plan offers better network
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service with more available usage on voice, text, data and other features. However,
a more expensive data plan also amounts to a higher total price, given that the
consumer will receive a higher monthly refund out of the bundle list price for that
data plan. Unfortunately, other than the aggregate sales of each bundle, the company
does not collect data on the sales specific to each data plan. Given the policy that
one can only upgrade a data plan (not the other way around) during the contract
course, and the fact that consumers do not have an accurate prior assessment of their
data usage, I chose the introductory plan for each bundle as the representative data
plan to construct the total price, which is either 66RMB or 96RMB depending on the
bundle list price.
I further augmented the sales data with additional measures of phone characteris-
tics, which are publicly available. These characteristics were chosen based on a survey
report conducted by iiMedia in 2012. In the survey, they asked consumers to name the
top ten characteristics that they care about in a phone. I include seven of them here:
operating system, manufacturer brand, screen size, camera mega-pixel, battery life,
CPU power and dual-SIMs-dual-standby. There were 119 bundles available over the
period of 34 months, each with a unique smartphone model that belongs to one of the
21 manufacturer brands.2 There are 119 bundles over the period of 34 months, each
with a unique smartphone model that belongs to one of the 21 manufacturer brands.
In terms of well-known operating systems, there were 89 models with Android, 5 mod-
els with iOS, 5 model with Symbian and 3 models with Windows. Summary statistics
of several key variables are shown in Table 1.1. For more summary statistics on the
manufacturer level, please refer to Table 4.1 in Appendix.
The first thing to notice is that the list prices vary greatly among bundles, with
2Dual-SIMs-dual-standby is a phone features that allows two sims cards adopted for two different
networks working at the same time, as if you had two phones embedded together.
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the most expensive more than ten times higher than the least expensive. Highly
correlated with the list prices, the retail prices of smartphones display the same
pattern of variation. Because consumers are not limited by data plan choices, the
variation of the bundle list prices largely reflects the quality differences of various
smartphone models. The monthly fee is the extra charge consumers face each month,
which is the plan fee net the monthly refund if the net value is positive, and zero
otherwise. It is worth remembering that the absolute value and variation might be
underestimated, and as such downward biases are subjected to data limitations, since
we do not know consumers’ choices of data plan at the beginning of the contract nor
how consumers adjust their data plans later.
Figure 1.3: Herfindahl index over time
Note: The index is calculated using the bundle sales of manufac-
turer relative to the total bundle sales of China Unicom in a given
period.
Sales also vary greatly within, as well as across, manufacturers. Apple holds the
dominant position in bundle sales, followed by Lenovo, Coolpad, ZTE, Huawei and
Sam-sung. The average shares of these six manufacturers together take up to 85% of
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the total bundle sales per period. This provides preliminary evidence that the market
of smartphones is highly concentrated. Figure 1.3 displays the Herfindahl index over
time, which reflects the evolution of market structure. The downward sloping line
describes a shift of market structure from highly concentrated to moderately con-
centrated when further down the road, suggesting the market of smartphones has
become more competitive, and smartphones from different manufacturers are more
substitutable between each other than before. A closer look on how such a shift
occurs is provided by Figure 1.5.
If we see market shares from the operating system view, nearly 70% of the smart-
phones in market are equipped with the Android system. “Others” under “Operating
systems” in Table 1.1 represents operation systems that are essentially Android-based
but with some alterations. With these included in the broader definition of Android,
Android occupies more than 80% of the smartphone market.
Last, product characteristics are improving over time. Figure 1.4 shows the evolv-
ing patterns of these characteristics across models by month. The pixel count in the
built-in camera improves substantially, the image quality in some of the high-end
models can match a moderate compact digital camera. Screen size is larger, with a
smaller margin around screen. Such improvements enhance the touch experience with
more sensitive and accurate operation. While all characteristics improve over time,
the most significant improvement seems to be the dual-SIMs-dual-standby feature,
with a little over 10% having space for an additional SIM card in the early periods,
while it was almost a common feature by the end of the data. Such growth is not so
much a technological advancement as a reflection of a shift in market share distribu-
tion among three wireless carriers. Even given that more and more consumers have
switched from China Mobile to China Unicom for their 3G network service, China
Mobile still possesses the largest share of mobile subscribers. Additionally, there are
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Figure 1.4: Product characteristics over time
no free-minutes calls across networks, meaning an extra per minute charge will be in-
curred each time a phone call is made from the Unicom network to another network
or the other way around, to a point where it is cheaper to have SIM cards for two
different networks. The increasing share of phones that have such a feature indirectly
suggests the growing market share of China Unicom in 3G subscribers.
Figure 1.5 graphs the dynamics of sales and prices of the six large firms over
time. I use 5% of the total market sales period as the threshold. Manufacturers
with average total sales greater than this threshold are labeled as large firms, and
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Figure 1.5: Market shares and prices over time
the rest are labeled as fringe firms. Among the six large manufacturers, only iPhone
and Samsung are foreign brands; the rest are all Chinese native brands. Prices are
the monthly simple averages: the discounted sum of an upfront bundle price and
a set of consecutive basic plan fees over the contract length. The one with the
price weighted by sales generated similar results.3 Until the second half of 2011,
3See Figure 4.1 in Appendix for reference
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iPhone was the leading force in bundle sales; however, it was matched by other
manufacturers in the later periods. Particularly worth noticing, Coolpad and Lenovo
became the new leading forces in bundle sales and continue to grow stronger over
time. There is overall a converging trend on sales among the six manufacturers, and
also a shift in the bundle sales market from foreign-dominated to native-dominated.
Unlike bundle sales, prices present a more widely spread pattern and are consistent
over time. Prices of bundles with a foreign manufacturer model are much higher than
those of native manufacturers. In particular, iPhone bundles are priced two to three
times higher than a non-iPhone bundle. Bundle prices of Samsung models rank as the
second highest. Others with native brand models charge relatively uniform prices, all
clustering around 2000RMB.
Figure 1.6: Wholesale price over time
Figure 1.6 shows the simple averages of manufacturer wholesale prices over time.
The key strategy for identification of service, is that with service entering a retailer’s
first-order condition and thus affecting manufacturer’s pricing behaviors, the variation
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in the wholesale prices provide the source of identification. As shown in Figure 1.6,
manufacturers do vary wholesale prices from time to time. Furthermore, the variation
pattern shares similar pattern as the pattern with final prices. Again, weighting by
sales does not alter the result much 4. Bundles with foreign manufacturers also have
overall higher wholesale prices, while native-manufactured bundles stay constantly
low.
The demographic dataset contains consumer information on living area, age
group and education level. The data comes from the Sixth National Census Report,
a nationwide census conducted in 2010, which is so far the most accurate source
of statistics on population demographics in China. With the statistics in the
report, I was able to construct the empirical joint distribution of demographics up
to three dimensions. The demographic dataset is supplemented with the average
demographics of smartphone purchasers, information also contained in the iiMedia
2012 survey report.
1.3 Theoretical Model
This section uses a simple model to show how we can learn about the effect of service
through manufacturer’s first order condition without actually observing service.
I take the service assignment as given such that retailer assumes full responsibility
in service provision, and the concept of service is any type of costly product promotion
that is specific to retailer, such as pre-purchase demonstration, post-purchase service
and eta. In the case of wireless market, this service can also be the effort of retailer
improving the network quality to better support smartphones that have heavy data
4See Figure 4.2 in Appendix for reference.
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usage. Other types of promotions that provided by manufacturers such as nation-
wide advertisement, either on TV, Internet or newspaper, are not included. I further
assume that the service is not observable to manufacturers. This is due to the nature
of service, which is difficult to measure. In addition, sending agents to every retail
store to monitor the performance of service is very costly.
As service expands the demand and thus the revenue, it benefits both manufac-
turer and retailer that retailer provides some service. However, manufacturer and
retailer might have a different mind when it comes to the optimal level of service,
and more likely than not, manufacturer usually wants a higher level of service than
retailer. Although not be able to directly control the service provision, there are sev-
eral options for manufacturer to induce retailer to provide the optimal level of service
such as vertical integration, resale price maintenance and exclusive contracts. Due to
the tedious legal process, vertical integration is not usually the best option. Resale
price maintenance is not an ideal choice either. On top of the fact that the practice
of resale price maintenance is illegal per se in China, writing down such a contract
is difficult for manufacturers. As smartphone is only part of the final product, which
is a “phone+network” bundle, manufacturer cannot enforce the resale price on net-
work service. These practical reasons make exclusive contract a better option in this
case. Exclusive contract has several attractive highlights. First, it gets rid of the
“free-riding” problem of service provision between retailers, which is one of the main
causes to the undersupply of service; second, granted the monopoly positive by the
exclusivity, the exclusive agent has all the market to himself; third, the exclusive agent
can charge the monopoly price-cost margins. No free-riding, higher market share and
higher per unit margin all would give the exclusive agent incentives to provide more
service.
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1.3.1 A Simple Model
In the final market, I assume the consumer has an isoelastic utility function from
a composite commodity y, u(y) = ε−1yε, ε ∈ [0, 1]. The commodity y follows a
Cobb-Douglas function of quantity of products (q) and associated services (z) given
as,
y = zλ qβ, λ+ β < 1, (1.1)
where λ and β denote the relative elasticities of service and product characteristics
hold in the commodity. Demand can be derived as a closed form function of retail
price and service such that
q(p, z) =
[
β zλε p−1
]1/1−βε
. (1.2)
There is one retailer in the final market distributing manufacturer’s product, and
he chooses retail price and service level that maximize his profit,
ΠR(p, z) = (p− w − γsz) q(p, z), (1.3)
where w is the wholesale price that manufacturer charges the retailer, γs is the
marginal cost of per-unit service. To keep case simple, I assume away any retail
associated marginal costs. Accordingly, the first order conditions over two choice
variables lead to,
pˆ =
1
ε(β − λ) w
zˆ =
λ
γs(β − λ) w,
(1.4)
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where (ˆ·) represents variables’ equilibrium values.5 Based on equation (1.4), retail
price is a constant markup over wholesale price. For price to be positive, β > λ,
and this suggests that service responses positively to a raise in wholesale price. The
intuition is that for every raise in wholesale price, retail margin increases, and it
increases retailer’s incentive to provide more service.
Taking retailer’s reaction function pˆ(·) and equilibrium quantity qˆ(·) as given,
manufacturer chooses wholesale price to maximize his profit,
ΠM(w) = (w − c) · qˆ(w), (1.5)
where c is the marginal cost of the product. The optimal wholesale price can be
derived from manufacturer’s first order condition,
wˆ =
1− λε
ε(β − λ)c. (1.6)
The main take away of equation (1.6) is that the wholesale price depends on the
service parameter. This provides a source of identification for the effect of service.
Limited by data, we cannot directly examine such effect, however, equation (1.6)
suggests that we can instead detect the impact of service through manufacturer’s
first order condition.
5Equilibrium quantity qˆ(w) = (κwλε−1)
1
1−βε , where κ = βε(β − λ)1−λε ( λγs )λε.
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1.4 Empirical Model
In this section, I construct an empirical demand and supply model that later will
be used to numerically estimate the magnitude of the service effect. In particular,
the construction of the supply model provides us with a close look at how retailers’
optimization of service enters manufacturer’s first-order condition, a mapping from
service to the wholesale price. I use a dynamic demand model for empirical estimation,
assuming consumers are forward-looking. Purchasing a bundle is a dynamic decision
for a consumer, not only because of the durability of the phone, but also because of
the switching cost if a consumer switches to a different carrier, as well as a possible
early termination fee if a consumer ends the contract before the legitimate termination
date. A dynamic model is more appropriate in a situation that has to do with durable
products and inter-temporal decision making. The model also allows consumers to
have heterogeneous preferences over product characteristics. In particular, I allow
consumers’ individual traits to interact with product characteristics, affecting the
consumer’s preferences differently when a consumer carries different traits.
In addition, I assume consumers have no intention to terminate the contract early
when purchasing and indeed stick with the contract throughout. This assumption
is based on a discussion with an industry source suggesting that there are few early
terminations overall. Phones being damaged or stolen does not necessarily lead to
early termination, as a consumer can continue the contract by reporting damage
and asking China Unicom to reissue a card associated with the bundle, however, the
consumer needs to purchase a no-contract phone as an replacement. Therefore, most
early terminations are due to other unexpected events. Due to the rarity of these
situations, I assume consumers do not account for involuntary early terminations
at the time of purchase. The lack of early termination and the length of the data
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collection period when combined give rise to the last assumption of the demand model,
the single purchase assumption. A typical contract lasts for two years and my data
length is close to three years; the combination of the two yield that it is most likely
consumers will make at most one purchase within data length.
I assume that retailers pick one level of service for each manufacturer at a given
time, such that products within the same manufacturer share the same amount of
service. The level of service varies from time to time. Given that China Unicom was
in an exclusive contract with Apple, I would expect there are more service efforts for
iPhones than other products.
1.4.1 Demand Model
The construction of consumer demand follows a standard model of discrete choice
(McFadden (1984); Berry (1994); Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes (1995); Nevo (2000)),
with modifications to accommodate a dynamic setting, as in the model by
Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2012). As defined in the data section, a product is
a “phone+network” bundle from China Unicom. Total market size consists of the
consumers who choose to purchase a phone from a carrier rather than a phone re-
tailer, either as a non-contract phone or as a bundle. The outside option is either a
non-contract phone from any of three carriers or a bundle from a rival carrier. In each
month t, a representative consumer i who is currently without a contract has two de-
cisions to make: to purchase a product or not and, if so, choosing which to purchase
from the product set available at month t, Jt. Any choice other than a product from
Jt is considered as an outside option. Conditional on purchasing a product, the gross
flow utility that consumer i gets from product j in month t is given by
22
δijt = xjt βi + ξjt +m+ t+ iPhonejt + λt zmt + αi fjt
= δnijt + αi fjt,
i = 1, . . . , ns; j ∈ Jt; t = 1, . . . , T ; m = 1, . . . ,M
(1.7)
where xjt are the observed product characteristics, ξjt captures the product char-
acteristics that are observed by the consumer but not by the econometrician, m
represents the fixed effect of the phone manufacturer (a time invariant product char-
acteristic), t identifies the unobserved time specific determinants of demand, zmt
represents carrier promotion service that is not observed by econometrician, with the
subscript m representing manufacturer m, and the subscript t means service is time
dependent, iPhonejt captures the effect of all other product promotions that is spe-
cific to iPhone but are not conducted by the retailer. The effect of retailer service
is captured by λt and the impact varies over time. The last term fjt is the monthly
access fee for the network service provided by the carrier.
Theoretically, λt picks up the impact of service on market shares only in terms of
carrier’s effort, whereas the retailer’s promotion effort for other manufacturers and
Apple’s promotion effort is either captured by t or iPhonejt. Empirically, however,
because service is not observed in data, it is impossible to separately identify λt from
the other variables in the demand estimation. Specifically, retailer’s general service for
all products will be captured in the time fixed effect and retailer’s special service for
iPhone will be captured in the iPhone-time effect. Although not separated identified
from the demand model, the service parameter meets the firm’s first-order condition,
which we can draw inference from. Details about service will be discussed further in
the supply model section.
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The random coefficients αi denote the consumer’s marginal disutility of price, and
βi denote the unknown consumer taste parameters for different product characteristics
other than price – parameters that vary by consumer but are constant over time. I
assume that the durability of the smartphone is one year longer than the length of its
contract, and that then the consumer can choose either to keep the phone for another
period or get rid of it with no cost. Utility from product characteristics other than
monthly access fee, called the net flow utility, is represented by δnijt, where n denotes
net value. Then the latent indirect utility of product jt for consumer i is the sum of
the discounted utility of the product, whose expression is given by,
uijt =
T∑
τ=1
rτ−1δnijt + αipjt + ijt, j = 1, . . . ,Jt, (1.8)
where pjt =
Tc∑
τ=1
rτ−1fjt + pbjt denotes the overall price that a consumer needs
to pay for bundle j, which is the discounted monthly access fee plus an one-time
payment at the beginning of the contract. T is the period length that consumer will
hold the phone, ijt is the i.i.d logit error distributed extreme value type I, capturing
consumer’s idiosyncratic purchase experience.6 Parameters αi captures consumer’s
disutility of price. The taste parameters (αi, βi) vary across consumers according to
the following formula:
 αi
βi
 =
 α¯
β¯
+ ΦDi + Σνi, (1.9)
6In the paper of Sinkinson (2014), he omitted the i.i.d. assumption on logit draws and opts instead
for only the random coefficients to rationalized consumer’s choice, as he argued that idiosyncratic
shocks are dependent on consumer’s state holdings and thus is not random. My model, however,
does not have such concerns: first is that the data starts at the beginning bundle sales, where no
consumers have contracts; second is that I assume no repurchasing during the course of contract.
Another reason has to do with the dynamics of the model, which make the i.i.d. assumption extra
attractive, is because it gives a nice analytical form of market shares.
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where (α¯, β¯) are the mean of consumer tastes, the parameter matrix Φ captures the
observed heterogeneity in consumers tastes, the deviation from mean tastes in pop-
ulation due to consumers’ various observed characteristics, while parameter matrix
Σ captures the unobserved taste heterogeneity due to unobserved consumer char-
acteristics. Accordingly, Di contains the observed consumer characteristics such as
residence area, educational achievement and age, and νi captures all other consumer
characteristics that are not included in D. In the econometric model, Di has an em-
pirical distribution Fˆ (D) from the demographic data, νi follows a normal distribution
with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix Σ to be estimated. For notational
convenience, from onwards, the mean taste parameters other than that for price will
be referred as linear parameters – denoted by θ1 = {β¯}, the parameter of price and
the those associated with consumers’ heterogeneous tastes will be referred to as the
non-linear parameters – denoted by θ2 = {α¯,Φ,Σ}. Such division matters in the
sense that θ1 are the coefficients of the product-specific component, which does not
vary with consumer characteristics, while as θ2 contains coefficients of the interac-
tions between product-specific and consumer characteristics. Also computationally,
given each guess of θ2, we first solve for δ
n(θ1) through nonlinear system of matching
predicted market shares to observed market shares before we estimate θ1 linearly. In
this sense, the mean price parameter α is included in θ2 although it is the parameter
of a consumer invariant product component.
Note that there is no continuation value in Equation (1.8), which follows the
assumption that consumers believe they drop out of the market after purchase. This
assumption fits reality; for example, before making a purchase, a consumer would
know whether Apple will release a new model next month and adjust their purchasing
decision accordingly. It may be the case that it is worth waiting one more month
versus purchasing at the moment. However, once a purchase has been made, the
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consumer drops from the market and no longer cares how market evolves afterwards.
With this said, the continuation value drops out of Equation (1.8).
If consumer i instead chooses the outside option, he will get a flow utility of the
outside option and a continuation value. As I cannot separately identify the value
between each outside option, I normalize the value of flow utility to zero. Let Ωt
denote all the current product characteristics and any other factor that affect the
future product characteristics. Let Vi(uijt,Ωt) denote the value function at time t,
then the indirect utility from choosing the outside option is written as
ui0t = rE[EVi(uijt,Ωt+1)|Ωt], (1.10)
where r is the monthly discounted rate equal 0.99, following existing literatures.
EVi(uijt,Ωt) denotes the expectation of the value function such that EVi(uijt,Ωt) =∫
it
Vi(εit, uijt,Ωt)dP, where it = {i0t, . . . , iJtt}. E[EVi(uijt,Ωt+1)|Ωt] is the contin-
uation value at time t, an expectation of value of purchase at t + 1 conditional on
current value. Gowrisankaran & Rysman (2012) provides a method to construct this
value using the logit inclusive value, which is the maximum discounted utility one can
get from the current product set, and assume it is sufficient for consumers to predict
the future values of the maximum discounted utility. Following Gowrisankaran &
Rysman (2012), define logit inclusive value for consumer i at month t as
uit = log
(∑
j∈Jt
exp(uijt)
)
, (1.11)
we can use logit inclusive value to replace the Ωt and rewrite the continuation value
function as E[Vi(ui,t+1)|uit], where
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Vi(ui,t+1) = log
(
exp(ui0t) + exp(uit)
)
. (1.12)
Now in order to solve the continuation value function, we only need to specify the
probabilities of various states of ui,t+1 that uit will transition into next period. Here
I assume that uit follows an autoregressive model of first-order,
ui,t+1 = ϕ1i + ϕ2i uit + εit, (1.13)
where εit is normally distributed with mean zero and ϕ1i and ϕ2i are parameters to
be estimated.
Finally, given the previous set-up, the unconditional purchase probability for con-
sumer i to purchase product j in time t is given by
sijt =
exp(uit)
exp(ui0t) + exp(uit)
× exp(uijt)
exp(uit)
, (1.14)
and the market share of product j in month t is
sjt =
∫
d
∫
ν
sijt dF (ν)dF (D). (1.15)
1.4.2 Supply Model
As mentioned earlier, we cannot directly estimate how consumers respond to service
as service is not observed; however, we can infer service through supply chain first-
order conditions. The goal of this section is to build one-to-one mapping between
service and wholesale price. I will start by deriving a retailer’s optimizing conditions
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over final price and service and then use them to solve for manufacturer’s first-order
condition over wholesale price. By the end of this section, I will be able to write down
the wholesale price-cost margin as a function of service parameter.
Specifically, the way I compute price-cost margins follows the method conducted
in Berry et al. (1995) – a static supply model that backs out price-cost margins by
applying the firm’s first-order condition of price with demand estimates. One would
naturally expect a dynamic supply model to follow a dynamic demand model. The
essential idea of a dynamic supply model is to change the relevant marginal revenue
from the current revenue to the present discounted value of the infinite stream of
future revenue. An empirical implementation was conducted in a separate paper
with Gowrisankaran and Rysman (Gowrisankaran, Rysman & Yu (2014)), where we
show how to compute price-cost margins non-parametrically under dynamic settings.
However, this method inevitably brings a substantial computational burden, as a
price change for a given product leads to not only the need to recompute market
shares for all the products in the current periods, but also for all the products in all
the following periods.
To reduce the computational burden without compromising the validity of results,
I instead focus on the main factor that determines the price other than product
quality, which is the population shares of holdings. A price drop today increases
holdings in the current period, thus eats away future demand, forcing the firm to
further lower the price in the future. The magnitude of the impact on future price
depends on how much market share the firm has. A firm with small market share
is much less affected than a large firm as the reduction in future demand will be
dissolved by rivals.7 As shown in the data section, the average market share of a firm
7In Gowrisankaran et al. (2014), we empirically confirmed this argument, showing that a firm
(Sony) with more than 50% market share is heavily affected by pricing dynamics; conversely, firms
with smaller market shares (around 20% or less, which included Canon, JVC and Panasonic) are
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is around 5%, which means the price-cost margins computed using the static model
are not significantly different from those computed using dynamic.
I will mainly focus on deriving the expressions for a linear pricing model with ser-
vice element (referred as a “double-margin service model”). Theories have suggested
that when it comes to vertical relationships such as exclusive territory, it is usually
optimal to employ a nonlinear pricing scheme, in which a manufacturer charges a
fixed fee and commits to a certain wholesale price. Although initially optimal, it is
not posteriorly optimal; after the manufacturer has broken the commitment once,
the best strategy is then to keep revising price every period. The data shows all
manufacturers changed wholesale price multiple times, which favors the use of the
linear pricing model.
Simple linear pricing model. In this scenario, the manufacturer sets the whole-
sale prices first and the carrier follows with retail prices and a certain level of service.
Each party tries to maximize its own profit. Such a setting inevitably leads to two
margins: a wholesale margin over manufacture cost and a retail margin over whole-
sale price and other carrier related costs, the so-called double-margin. To solve for
the expression, I start with the carrier’s profit function. Based on the data structure,
I observe one carrier that carries products from various manufacturers. Thus, I as-
sume there are M manufacturers each with a product set Jm, m = 1, . . . ,M, and
one carrier whose product set is the size of all manufacturers’ product sets together,
J = {Jm, m = 1, . . . ,M}. I index carrier by subscript c, carrier c’s profit function
in month t is,
pict =
M∑
m=1
∑
j∈Jmt
(pjt − wjt − γszmt)sjt(p, z), (1.16)
affected very little , ignoring the dynamic consideration.
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where pjt denotes final price, wjt is the associated wholesale price paid to manufacturer
by retailer, zmt represents the promotion service for manufacturer m and γ
s is the
service cost parameter. Demand of bundle sjt is a function of both price and service.
Also, I assume away carrier’s marginal cost other than wholesale price and those
related to service because of two reasons. First is of the limited data source; second
is the cost associated with bundle sales is most likely incurred by carriers on a store
level rather than on product level. An additive fixed fee to the profit function would
not alter carrier’s first-order condition.
The carrier has two variables to optimize: retail prices and promotion services for
manufacturers. The first-order condition with respect to the price product j is given
by,
sjt +
M∑
m=1
∑
q∈Jmt
(pqt − wqt − γszmt)∂sqt
∂pjt
= 0. (1.17)
Let 4ct be the matrix that contains the first-order derivatives of market shares
with respect to retail prices for the products that sold by carrier c in time t, with
entry (j, q) entry equal ∂sqt
∂pjt
8 and stack all the first-order conditions of the product
in Jt, we obtain the carrier’s first-order condition with respect to price, written in
vector form as the following,
pt − wt − γszt = −4−1ct st(p, z). (1.18)
Similarly, we can write down carrier’s first-order condition with respect to service
8Here I omit the ownership matrix of carrier, Ict where entry (i, j) = 1 if both product i and j are
sold by the same retailer and 0 otherwise. Since I only have data on China Unicom, all elements in
Ict are ones. Note that this would not be the same case when it comes to manufacturer’s ownership
matrix, as the carrier sells products from various manufacturers at the same time.
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zmt as,
M∑
l=1
∑
q∈Jlt
(pqt − wqt − γszlt) ∂sqt
∂zmt
− γs
∑
q∈Jmt
sqt = 0, (1.19)
and the vector form of the service first-order condition is given as, pt − wt − γszt =
4szγs
∑
smt(p, z), where 4sz is the market share response matrix to service.
Each manufacturer m in month t chooses wholesale price w to optimize its profit
function. This is conditional on carrier’s reaction according to Equation (1.18) and
(1.19) . The manufacturer m’s profit function is given by,
pimt =
∑
j∈Jmt
(wjt − cjt)sjt (pˆ(w), zˆ(w)) , (1.20)
where c is the manufacturer marginal cost and (ˆ·) denotes carrier’s best response at
the equilibrium given wholesale prices. As carrier bears full responsibility in pro-
viding service, manufacturer is free of service cost. Assuming a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium in the wholesale prices, manufacturer m’s first-order conditions are the
following for a given wholesale price wjt,
sjt +
∑
k∈Jt
∑
q∈Jmt
(wqt − cqt)(∂sqt
∂pkt
∂pkt
∂wjt
+
∂sqt
∂zkt
∂zkt
∂wjt
) = 0, ∀j ∈ Jmt. (1.21)
Because the matrix in the second parenthesis becomes very complicated when
there are multiple products and manufacturers. To obtain this, it is easier to break
down and compute piece by piece. We already have matrices of market share response
to final price and service, which are 4c and 4sz respectively. There are two matrices
left in parentheses yet to be defined. The One with the element (j, q) equal
∂pjt
∂wqt
,
denoted as 4p, is the matrix of the derivatives of all the retail prices with respect to
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all the wholesale prices. The other one is the service response matrix with respect to
wholesale prices, 4z, with element (j, q) as ∂zj∂wq . Note that other than matrix 4p, all
three matrices have components of the first-order derivatives with respect to service,
which make them functions of λ. In particular, matrix 4z is also a function of γs.
Now I proceed to the construction of these matrices.
Let us start with matrix 4p. Dropping time subscript to simplify notation, the
total differentiation of carrier’s first-order condition on price (Equation (1.17)) for a
given j with respect to all retail prices (pk, ∀k ∈ J ), all the services (zl, l = 1, . . . ,M)
and a wholesale price wf is given by,
∑
k∈J
[
∂sj
∂pk
+
∂sk
∂pj
+
M∑
m=1
∑
q∈Jm
(pq − wq − γszm) ∂
2sq
∂pj∂pk
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
g(j,k)
dpk
dwf
+
M∑
l=1
[
∂sj
∂zl
− γs
∑
q∈Jl
∂sq
∂pj
+
M∑
m=1
∑
q∈Jm
(pq − wq − γszm) ∂
2sq
∂pj∂zl
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
κ(j,l)
dzl
dwf
− ∂sf
∂pj︸︷︷︸
h(j,f)
= 0
(1.22)
Let G be the matrix with general element g(j, k), K denote the matrix with
element κ(j, l), where κ(j, l) is a column vector of the length of product counts of
manufacturer l, and H denote the matrix with element h(j, f) and its fth column
Hf . Putting together all the products j ∈ J , we have G dpdwf + K dzdwf = Hf . I will
derive the expression of matrix 4z shortly, let us assume for now that 4z is known,
which fth column is dz
dwf
. After some arrangements, the fth column of matrix 4p is
obtained as,
dp
dwf
= G−1
(
Hf −K dz
dwf
)
. (1.23)
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Stacking all columns together, 4p = G−1 (H −K4z). The derivation of ma-
trix 4z uses the same approach as 4p, by totally differentiating carrier’s first-order
condition on service (Equation (1.19)), only this time with respect to all services
(zk, k = 1, . . . ,M) and a wholesale price wf . Again omitting the time subscription
t, the expression is given as
M∑
k=1
[ M∑
l=1
∑
q∈Jl
(pq − wq − γszl) ∂
2sq
∂zm∂zk
− γs
∑
q∈Jk
∂sq
∂zm
− γs
∑
q∈Jm
∂sq
∂zk
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
s(m,k)
dzk
dwf
− ∂sf
∂zm︸︷︷︸
b(m,f)
= 0.
(1.24)
I use S and B to denote matrices with element s(m, l) and b(m, f) respectively.
Element s(m, k) is a block matrix with row length equal to the number of products
of m and column length equal the number of products of k; element b(m, f) is a row
vector of the length equal the number of products of manufacturer m. Putting all
products together and completing some simple algebra yields
4z = S−1B, (1.25)
The expressions for the other two matrices 4c and 4sz are derived in Appendix B.
With all the pieces gathered, using4w to denote the market share response matrix to
wholesale price with the form of4w(λ, γs) = 4′p4c+4′z4sz, the wholesale price-cost
margin written in vector form is derived as,
wt − ct = − (Iw · 4w(λt, γs))−1 st(p, z), (1.26)
where Iw is manufacturer’s ownership matrix with element (i, j) = 1 if both
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products i and j are produced by the same manufacturer. Equation (1.26) provides
the source of identification of the service parameters. The identification of service is
similar to the way that BLP identifies wholesale price. In Berry et al. (1995), they
assume there is no role for service, and identify the wholesale price by using firm’s
first-order condition of marginal revenue equal marginal cost, where marginal revenue
is a function of price, market share, demand elasticity and wholesale price. Price and
market share are directly observed in data, and the demand estimation provides
the demand elasticities. In my case, I observe the wholesale price but allow for a
more flexible setting of service, so service is the parameter that enters the demand
elasticities and cannot be picked up by the demand estimation. In other words,
there is a relationship between price, market share and markup that implies service
parameter to be zero, which is the BLP relationship. However, I observe a different
relationship in the data, and I try to find the service parameter that rationalizes such
relationship.
Note that this model has embedded in the simple pricing model without service,
a case that coincides with the scenario of simple linear pricing model in Villas-Boas
(2007). To obtain the expressions for this model, one simply drops out the second
term in 4w. The construction of 4p becomes simpler too, as the second part of
Equation (1.22) also drops out, the matrix becomes 4p = G−1H, with general
element (j, q) =
∂pj
∂wq
.
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1.5 Estimation and Identification
1.5.1 Demand model estimation
The empirical estimation proceeds in two steps, given in backward order. Starting
from the last stage, I estimate the demand model of the “phone+network” bundle
using sales and demographic data . The estimation strategy uses the generalized
method of moments (GMM) taken by Berry et al. (1995) and Petrin (2002), with
my moments consisting of three sets. First two sets are the Berry et al. moments –
the set of moments matches the model’s share predictions to those observed in the
data and the set of moments related to the unobserved demand disturbances ξj(θ).
Recalling that θ2 denotes the set of demand parameters that enter the mean utility
function nonlinearly, the first set of moments are
sj
(
δj(θˆ2), θˆ2
)
− sj = 0, j = 0, 1, . . . ,J . (1.27)
Solving this requires a fix point computation in which we start with a guess of the
monthly flow utility
−→
δ and cycle it through Equation (1.7) and (1.14) until a fixed
point is found. To guarantee the identification of the model, one needs to prove that
such point is unique. However, it cannot be proven in a dynamic setting unless we can
show that all current and future products are substitutes, a condition shown in Berry
et al. (1995) that is necessary for the uniqueness. I’ve tested with different initial
values of
−→
δ and it always converges to the same value and hence assume that for any
vector of parameter θ2, there is a unique vector
−→
δ such that
−→ˆ
s = −→s (−→δ (θ2), θ2)).
The second set of moments are based on the moment condition that
E
[
ξj(θ)|Zdj
]
= 0, (1.28)
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where Zdj is a vector of exogenous variables, performing as instruments for de-
mand model. The choice of the set of instruments is discussed in the subsection
“Identifications and instruments”.
The last set of moments are the micro moments, aiming to provide more accurate
demand estimates when consumer-level data is not observable. According to Petrin
(2002) and Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes (2004), information that relates demographic
averages of consumers to the products they purchase plays the same role as consumer-
level data. Supplementing market-level data with such information helps to precisely
identify the relevant substitution patterns when price and product characteristics are
not sufficient to do so. The China Statistical Yearbook 2010 (CSY 2010) contains
information to construct a joint distribution of population by living area, educational
achievement and age group,9 and the IIMedia China Smart Phone Market Annual
Research Report 2012 provides information on corresponding demographic averages
of purchasers of new smart-phones 10. Combining these pieces of information, I can
construct the third set of moments – micro-moments, matching model predictions to
the following averages:
E
[
d¯− E [di|{i purchases new model}]
]
= 0, (1.29)
where d ∈ {area, education, age} and d¯ is the according averages conditional on
purchasing observed in data. To be more specific, the first micro-moment matches to
the average probability of living in different areas (city, outside the city) conditional on
new model purchase; the second matches the the share of population with different
9The 2010 Yearbook contains the results from the sixth nationwide population census. Its statis-
tics are the most comprehensive and accurate among all recent yearbooks, and it is the only yearbook
that has information on joint distribution of the three demographic variables.
10With in my data length, the variation in demographics are negligible, I use the statistics from
the CSY 2010 and IIMedia Report 2012 to approximate the corresponding demographic averages
within the data length.
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education levels (junior, senior high and equivalent, bachelor) conditional on new
model purchase; and the last matches to the probability of being in different age
groups (18-34, 35-54 and >54) conditional on new model purchase. More details on
the construction of micro-moments are discussed in Appendix A.
Stacking all sets of moments together and using G1(θ) to denote the one matching
market shares, G2(θ) to denote the mean independent conditions and G3(θ) to denote
the one matching consumer demographics, we have the population moments
E [G(θ0)] = E

G1(θ0)
G2(θ0)
G3(θ0)
 = 0. (1.30)
Hansen (1982) shows that the optimal two-step GMM estimator takes the follow-
ing form:
θ∗ = arg min
θ∈	
Gˆ(θ)′WGˆ(θ), (1.31)
where Gˆ(·) is the sample analogue of G(·); W is the weight matrix. In the first
step, use W = (Zd
′
Zd)−1 to obtain the preliminary consistent estimate of the true
value, θ˜, and at the second step substitute W with the optimal weighting matrix,
S˜−1 = E
[
GG′
∣∣∣
θ˜
]
, the inverse of the asymptotic variance-covariance matrix of mo-
ments evaluated at θ˜. Let Γ(θ˜) = E
[
∂G
∂θ′
∣∣∣
θ˜
]
, denote the first-order derivation of
moments with respect to parameters evaluated at θ˜, and the asymptotic variance of
the two-step GMM estimator with optimal weighting matrix is,
V (θ∗) = N−1
(
Γ′S˜Γ
)−1
(1.32)
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1.5.2 Service estimation
I start by writing down the cost functions. For each guess of service parameters,
marginal cost can be computed as a function of (λ, γs)using the method described in
the empirical model supply section. Since I cannot separately identify λt and γ
s, I
normalized γs = 1 and λt captures the benefit of service on demand relative to service
cost. Similar to product characteristics in the demand model, cost characteristics are
decomposed into one subset which is observed by econometricians and an unobserved
component. For a given product j in time t, using xcj to denote the cost vector and
ωj to denote the unobserved cost component, the marginal cost cj, is written as
cj(λt) = x
c
jγ + ωj + εj, (1.33)
where γ is the vector that contains the cost parameters other than service. I include
all the product characteristics x are in xc, and expect ω to be correlated with ξ. This
is because whichever unobserved product characteristics improve the product quality
might also be costly to produce. Given Equation (1.26), substituting the expression
for marginal cost and we have the following,
wt + (Iw · 4w(λt))−1st(p, z) = xctγ + ωt + εt. (1.34)
Note that the price-cost margins are a function of demand model parameters and
both retail and wholesale prices. According to Equation (1.26), wholesale price w is
a function of ω, together with the correlation between ξ and ω, I cannot assume the
variables on the left-hand side of Equation (1.34) are uncorrelated with ω. Just as in
estimating the demand model, I can construct supply model moment conditions by
assuming orthogonality between ω and appropriate instruments. Letting Zs denote
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the instrument set for supply model, we have the moment condition for supply model
written as,
E
[
ωj(λt)|Zsj
]
= 0. (1.35)
The remaining estimation is the same as the demand model; the only difference
is that the population moments are consisted solely by the independent moment
conditions.
Last but not least, to capture the time variant feature of the retailer service, I
assume λt is a linear function of time with the form given as
λt = ψ0 + ψ1t, (1.36)
where ψ1 captures the time variant effect. Therefore, the service estimation is in
search for the optimal parameters ψ∗ = {ψ∗0, ψ∗1} that minimize the GMM objective
function of the supply model.
1.5.3 Identification and instruments
There are two sets of demand parameters: those that enter the demand model nonlin-
early θ2 = {α,Φ,Σ}, and those that enter linearly θ1 = {β¯k, k ∈ K}. Micro-data al-
lows me to identify the parameters in θ2, even without assumptions on the distribution
of ξ. Given a set of parameter values θˆ2, consumers with different demographic at-
tributes (both observable and unobservable) interacting with product characteristics
will yield different product choices and thus different average attributes conditional
on product purchase. By requiring the model parameters to generate predictions of
average attributes matching those observed in data, I obtain the source of identifica-
tion of θ2. The interaction between consumer attributes and product characteristics
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also determines substitution patterns. As the variance of consumer attributes {Φ,Σ}
for the k product characteristic increases, products with this characteristic become
better substitutes, and there is disproportionally more share-shifting toward these
products when the current product is no longer available. The dynamic model pro-
vides substitution patterns across periods in addition to within periods.These together
would provide more accurate estimation for demographic coefficients. The identifica-
tion of the remaining parameters θ1, the mean preferences of product characteristics
other than price, requires the market-level data. They are identified by the change of
product j’s market share associated with change in the product characteristic.
The service parameter is identified by the change in manufacturer’s wholesale
prices associated with a change in retailer’s optimization over service. The time
trend coefficient of service will be further identified by the variations of wholesale
prices within the manufacturer across periods.
As is standard in existing literature, retail price is endogenously correlated with
unobserved demand disturbance ξ. The other observed products characteristics are
exogenous, therefore, observed product characteristics other than price are the first to
be included as instruments. Inspired by Berry et al. (1995), I construct the remaining
set of instruments for the demand model by first exploiting factors that affect a firm’s
market power. I include average characteristics of the products that produced by the
same firm and those produced by rival firms, the counts of own and rivals’ products;
as each month is a separate market, these attributes are at monthly base. I also
includes dummies for the six large manufacturers. 11
These variables would either raise or lower a firm’s market power. For example,
market averages tend to lower a firm’s market power and the firm’s indicator tends
11The six manufacturers, ranked by market share from high to low as: Apple, Lenovo, Coolpad,
ZTE, Huawei and Samsung.
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to raise its market power. Other than the variables that affect a firm’s market power,
cost shifters are also part of the instruments set. For this, I include the wholesale
price for each model and the averages for products that produced by the same firm
and those produced by rival firms. All of these variables are correlated with price and
mean independent of the demand disturbance, thus are appropriate instruments for
a demand model.
The choice of instruments for the supply disturbance ω is as that for demand
except that I drop wholesale price and the related brand and market averages because
wholesale price is endogenous to ω.
1.6 Empirical Results
1.6.1 Demand estimation
The parameter estimates of the demand model are presented in Table 1.2. The Table
contains demand estimates of five specifications. All five specifications are under
the dynamic single purchase setting, assuming that consumers look forward into the
future waiting for the best purchase and will drop out of the market once a purchase
has been made. The first two columns present the results of the simple logit model
with only mean taste parameters, a model considered by Melnikov (2013), where
the evaluation of the market per period, a term similar to logit inclusive value, is
captured by time dummies. Column 1 shows the results from the simple OLS logit
model, ignoring the possible effect of endogenous price, while column 2 takes into
account the endogeneity issue. Theoretically, if some unobserved product quality is
positively correlated with price, then an estimation that doesn’t address the issue
properly would lead to over-estimated parameters. As shown, the price coefficient
in the OLS logit model has been substantially over-estimated, compared to the one
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estimated using the instrument: −1.73 versus −1.44. For other coefficients, OLS
logit and IV logit generate similar results, although with IV logit has overall higher
significance. As expected, price contributes negatively to consumers’ utility, with a
mean coefficient of −1.73. The magnitude of price suggests that consumers’ demand
for a bundle is elastic. Consumers obtain a negative gross utility(constant term
in mean coefficients) from the bundle when all other characteristics equal zero, a
comparison between a product in the market and outside option. Negative value is
a simple reflection of the market share of product compared to the greater share of
the outside option. Constant terms together with time dummies also capture both
any change in competition among rivals and demand shocks that are common to the
industry. Note that all parameters are estimated based on the discounted utility.
All parameters of the bundle characteristics, including screen size, battery life,
CPU speed, dual-SIMs-dual-standby and whether the smartphone model is an im-
ported brand, have expected signs and most of them are significant.12 Among all the
product characteristics, an imported brand seems to enter consumers’ utility function
with the greatest impact, increasing the utility by 1% with the indicator equal one.
This impact is conditional on having controlled for other characteristics, meaning
that with the same characteristics, a smartphone of a foreign brand is more popular
than a native brand. This could be the original design, or operating system (each
manufacturer usually is dedicated to one operating system at a time), or some other
quality enhancers that are not measurable. Last but not least, the parameters of
characteristics are smaller in absolute values compared to the constant term, suggest-
ing that the product differentiations among bundles are important but smaller than
12I excluded camera pixels from demand estimation, due to its highly colinearity with screen size.
A manufacturer would not build a model that has a huge gap between camera pixels and screen
size, as only when they have similar quality level would they together provide the best performance.
I further tested by including camera pixels in demand estimation, and as I expected, none of the
coefficients of camera pixels are significant in any model specifications.
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Table 1.2: Parameter Estimates of Dynamic Demand Model
OLS Logit
Instrumen-
tal Variable
Logit
Random
Coefficients
Random
Coefficients
with Micro-
moments
(4) with
iPhone-
time
Dummy
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Random Coefficents {Φ,Σ}
Constant 2.08 (0.12)∗∗∗ 2 (0.13)∗∗∗ 2.01 (0.19)∗∗∗
Log price 0.1 (0.003)∗∗∗ 0.11 (0.006)∗∗∗ 0.11 (0.007)∗∗∗
City 3.91 (0.42)∗∗∗ 6.26 (0.46)∗∗∗
Senior high 0.08 (0.04) 0.06 (0.05)
Bachelor 0.29 (0.02)∗∗∗ 0.31 (0.03)∗∗∗
Age: 18− 34 5.05 (1.05)∗∗∗ 5.48 (1.31)∗∗∗
Age: 35− 54 0.65 (0.85) 0.55 (0.46)
Mean Coefficients {α¯, β¯}
Constant −4.79 (2.19)∗ −3.97 (1.73) −6.1 (1.16)∗∗∗ −9.45 (1.18)∗∗∗ −15.73 (1.19)∗∗∗
Log price −1.44 (0.23)∗∗∗ −1.73 (0.38)∗∗∗ −2.01 (0.63)∗∗∗ −2.13 (0.6)∗∗∗ −1.91 (0.61)∗∗∗
Log ss 1.21 (0.45)∗∗ 1.41 (0.48)∗∗ 0.95 (0.23)∗∗∗ 1.04 (0.23)∗∗∗ 0.86 (0.36)∗∗
Log battery 0.94 (0.35)∗∗ 0.99 (0.35)∗∗ 0.61 (0.19)∗∗ 0.68 (0.2)∗∗ 0.71 (0.37)∗
Log CPU 0.54 (0.18)∗∗ 0.6 (0.18)∗∗∗ 0.41 (0.08)∗∗∗ 0.44 (0.09)∗∗∗ 0.32 (0.11)∗∗
DSDS 0.33 (0.11)∗∗ 0.3 (0.11)∗∗ 0.14 (0.06)∗ 0.11 (0.06) 0.17 (0.11)
Imported 0.95 (0.17)∗∗∗ 1.04 (0.19)∗∗∗ 0.66 (0.08)∗∗∗ 0.71 (0.08)∗∗∗ 0.74 (0.08)∗∗∗
Measure of fit:
Adjusted R2 0.92
First stage:
R2 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.99
F-Statistic 51.49∗∗∗ 51.5∗∗∗ 51.5∗∗∗ 54.93∗∗∗
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All models include manufacturer dummies and time
dummies. There are 883 observations. Significance level indicator : ∗p < 0.05;∗∗ p < 0.01;∗∗∗ p <
0.001.
the differentiation from the outside options.
For the test of validity of instruments, the “First stage” section in Table 1.2 shows
that both values of the first stage R2 and F − statistic are high, implying that the
instruments used here are of high relevance to the endogenous price and therefore are
valid.
Throughout column 3 to column 5 other than the price related coefficients, pa-
rameters are estimated based on the monthly flow utility of the bundle. To make
the results comparable to the first two columns, magnitudes of coefficients other than
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price (including mean and random coefficients) from column 3 to column 5 are mul-
tiplied by the discounted factor, which is (1− βT−1)/(1− β). Column 3 presents the
estimates using the dynamic model described in section 4.1, a base line model with
only two random coefficients, one on constant term and one on price. The random co-
efficients on the constant term and price are both positive and significant, suggesting
there are substantial variations among consumers in the utility from a bundle as well
as distaste on price. In particular, the magnitude of the random coefficient on price
is higher than that on the constant term, indicating consumers are more sensitive
to the price of the product relative to quality. Adding random coefficients to help
explain the variation in price, the mean parameter of price is lower than the simple
logit model.
Column 4 provides the estimates using the same model as column 3 but with
a richer setting, using additional micro-moments to infer the effect of consumers’
demographic characteristics on the bundle utility. The implications of demographic
characteristics are helpful to further explain the variations in consumers’ preferences
over themean utility and price. Information on consumer’s income is helpful to explain
consumers’ various tastes on price. As I do not observe the distribution of consumers’
income, I use educational achievement as an approximation for income, assuming that
consumers with higher educational achievements generally have more income. The
indicator of being a city resident and in a certain age group help us understand the
variation in consumers’ evaluations over the mean utility. As the results show, a city
resident values the bundle more than a non-city resident by 19%; young adults value
the bundle more than consumers from other age groups. On the price front, having
a senior high school degree does not make a significant difference in price sensitivity
compared to those who are less educated; on the other hand, having a bachelor degree
makes a consumer 13% less price sensitive than those who have a lower educational
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achievement. Mean coefficients estimates show similar magnitude between column 3
and column 4.
Finally, column 5 shows the estimates of adding the iPhone-time interaction term
on top of the model setting in specification (4). Specification (4) assumes the level
of service that the retailer picks for each manufacturer is not substantially different
from each other, so the effect of service varies only by time but not across manufac-
turers. As a result, the time dummies capture the effect of retailer’s service together
with other unobserved time specific demand shocks. Specification (5) further allows
for the retailer to differ the service between manufacturers. Under the impression
that an exclusive contract gives the retailer incentive to provide extra service for the
manufacturer, the iPhone-time dummies will pick up the special treatment that the
retailer offers specifically for iPhone. Also captured by the iPhone-time dummies
are any iPhone-time specific shocks, which includes the promotion effort from the
manufacturer. As shown, most of the parameters have similar values in comparison
to column (4) with the exception of the random coefficient of city residence. The
price coefficient is slightly lower than the one in columns (3) and (4). The overall
significances for the mean coefficients are lower than (3) and (4), which is probably
caused by adding the extra iPhone-time dummies. Given that results do not differ
much between columns (4) and (5), and given the concern of over identification, I will
use the results from column (4) in the service estimation.
Continuing with demand estimates, Table 1.3 presents the value of manufacturer’s
fixed effect under four specifications. The five specifications present similar results,
bearing in mind that results from the last three columns are multiplied by the dis-
count vector to be comparable across specifications. Consumers show strong pref-
erence towards iPhone relative to other models and value the bundle with iPhone
on average 3 times more than the bundles with other phones. For all native man-
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Table 1.3: Manufacturer Fixed Effect Estimates
OLS Logit
Instrumen-
tal Variable
Logit
Random
Coefficients
Random
Coefficients
with Micro-
moments
(4) with
iPhone-
time
Dummy
Manufacturer (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coolpad 0.84 (0.16)∗∗∗ 0.86 (0.15)∗∗∗ 0.49 (0.08)∗∗∗ 0.5 (0.08)∗∗∗ 0.76 (0.15)∗∗∗
Huawei 0.72 (0.16)∗∗∗ 0.72 (0.16)∗∗∗ 0.43 (0.09)∗∗∗ 0.45 (0.09)∗∗∗ 0.67 (0.15)∗∗∗
Apple 2.35 (0.2)∗∗∗ 2.53 (0.28)∗∗∗ 1.49 (0.08)∗∗∗ 1.58 (0.08)∗∗∗ 4.01 (1.06)∗∗∗
Lenovo 0.57 (0.15)∗∗∗ 0.56 (0.15)∗∗∗ 0.33 (0.08)∗∗∗ 0.33 (0.08)∗∗∗ 0.59 (0.15)∗∗∗
Samsung −0.01 (0.13) −0.02 (0.13) 0.00 (0.07) 0.01 (0.07) 0.06 (0.12)
ZTE 0.85 (0.17)∗∗∗ 0.86 (0.16)∗∗∗ 0.5 (0.09)∗∗∗ 0.51 (0.09)∗∗∗ 0.76 (0.16)∗∗∗
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level indicator : ∗p < 0.05;∗∗ p <
0.01;∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
ufacturers, consumers do not seem to distinguish much among brands. Each of the
six large manufacturers except Samsung are significantly more popular than other
fringe manufacturers (baseline). Part of the reason Samsung does not stand out may
be its wide-spread product spectrum. Manufacturers other than Samsung have par-
ticular marketing strategies, eg., Apple markets itself as high-end luxurious product
and other native brands target the major population with economy models – less
advanced configurations with very affordable prices. Samsung’s product line reaches
to both ends. For example, on the high-end, Samsung Galaxy S II GT-I9100 is a
relative close substitute to the iPhone with bundle list price 4938RMB, whereas on
the low end, Samsung Corby S3370 only costs 1240RMB.
In section 3.1, the logit inclusive value is defined as the value of purchasing as
opposed to the value of the outside option, where the value of purchasing in my
case is the value of purchasing a bundle from China Unicom as opposed to other
alternatives. Figure 1.7 describes the evolution of this value over time. The line LIV
(4) denotes the logit inclusive value computed from specification (4) – logit model
with random coefficients and micro-moments. The time dummy in Melinkov’s model
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Figure 1.7: Value of Purchasing from China Unicom
(specification (2)), denoted by LIV (2) is equivalent to the logit inclusive value and
therefore can be used as a reference. I also include the time fixed effect and the iPhone-
time fixed effect, in which the former captures the time specific demand shock that
is common to all products, including the carrier’s general services for all products,
and the latter captures the retailer’s special service for iPhone and other product
promotions conducted by Apple. The logit inclusive value from specification (2) and
(4) overall presents similar upward trends over time, although the values at the early
periods are higher in specification (2) than (4). In particular, both lines go flat in
the first half of 2012, which could indicate the impact of Apple forming a partnership
with China Telecom. Also, there is an “M” shape pattern around January every
year, which is the time right before the most significant Chinese holiday – the Spring
Festival. The first spike could reflect the consumer’s increasing need to shop for the
holiday and the retailer’s extra promotion effort in catering the increasing demand.
Most firms will close business during the holiday which may explain the drop in the
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value right after the first spike and before they resume business after the holiday. The
time fixed effect does not have much fluctuation other than the “M” shape holiday
effect, suggesting the retailer’s general service effort is relatively constant over time.
However, the iPhone-time fixed effect displays more fluctuations and a slight drop
over time. In particular, each spike on the curve happens during the time where a
new iPhone model was being released, which are September 2010 (iPhone 4), April
2012 (iPhone 4S) and December 2012 (iPhone 5). Another interesting feature of the
iPhone-time fixed effect is that as opposed to the other curves, there is a significant
drop between February 2012 to March 2012. Such a drop is more likely due to the
reduction of the retailer’s special service for iPhone; it would not otherwise make sense
for Apple to reduce advertising just before releasing a new model. Apple formed a
partnership with China Telecom in March 2012, which is probably the cause of China
Unicom’s drop in special service as an response to the event.
For a robustness check, I also estimate the static version of the demand model.
As opposed to the dynamic model where bundle is a durable good and consumers
only purchase once in a life time, a static model assumes the bundle contract only
last for one period and consumers are free to purchase a different bundle the next
period. The estimation results are shown in Table 1.4. The two specifications here
correspond to the random coefficients and random coefficients with micro-moments
in the dynamic setting respectively. For the mean coefficients other than price, the
results from the static model do not differ much from the dynamic model. However,
they are significantly different from the dynamic model in the random coefficients,
particularly the specification with micro-moments. The mean coefficient on price in
the static model is slightly lower than that in the dynamic setting, −2.05 versus −2.01
for the model with only random coefficients, however higher in the specification with
extra micro-moments. In addition, all of the demographic coefficients other than
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Table 1.4: Parameter Estimates of Static Demand Model
Static Random
Coefficients
Static Random
Coefficients with
Micro-moments
Parameter (1) (2)
Random Coefficents {Φ,Σ}
Constant 1.22 (0.4)∗∗∗ 0.26 (0.42)
Price 0.2 (0.05)∗∗∗ 0.08 (0.11)
City 0.48 (0.36)
Senior high −0.16 (7.35)
Bachelor 3.77 (0.42)∗∗∗
Age: 18− 34 5.61 (3.57)
Age: 35− 54 4.41 (3.15)
B. Mean Coefficients {α¯, β¯}
Constant −6.16 (1.17)∗∗∗ −11.21 (1.17)∗∗∗
Log price −2.05 (0.01)∗∗∗ −2.06 (0.04)∗∗∗
Log ss 0.81 (0.23)∗∗∗ 0.89 (0.22)∗∗
Log battery 0.57 (0.19)∗∗ 0.59 (0.19)∗∗
Log CPU 0.35 (0.09)∗∗∗ 0.38 (0.09)∗∗∗
DSDS 0.16 (0.06)∗∗ 0.15 (0.06)∗
Imported 0.59 (0.08)∗∗∗ 0.62 (0.08)∗∗∗
First stage:
R2 0.94 0.95
F-Statistic 51.5∗∗∗ 51.5∗∗∗
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. All models include
manufacturer dummies and time dummies. There are 883
observations. Significance level indicator : ∗p < 0.05;∗∗ p <
0.1;∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
“bachelor” show more variations in the static model. The overall significance level in
the static model is lower than the dynamic model. To conclude, static and dynamic
models generate results with substantial differences, and the dynamic model is more
appropriate here knowing consumers are forward-looking.
1.6.2 Service Estimation
The estimates of the service parameter and other cost parameters are presented in
Table 1.5. The demand estimates used in service estimation are from the specification
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Table 1.5: Estimated Service and Cost Parameters
Paramter Coefficients S.E. Sig.
Service Coefficients {ψ0, ψ1}
ψ0 6.64e
−6 1.89e−9 ∗∗∗
ψ1 −1.95e−7 6.74e−10 ∗∗∗
Mean Min Max
λ˜drt 5.71e
−5 7e−11 1.38e−4
Cost Coefficients {γ}
Constant 1.08 0.47 ∗
Log ss 0.71 0.09 ∗∗∗
Log battery 0.52 0.08 ∗∗∗
Log CPU 0.23 0.04 ∗∗∗
DSDS −0.25 0.02 ∗∗∗
Coolpad −0.02 0.03
Huawei 0.01 0.04
Apple 0.78 0.03 ∗∗∗
Lenovo 0.03 0.03
Samsung 0.05 0.03
ZTE 0.05 0.04
First stage:
R2 0.78
F-Statistic 25.4∗∗∗
Note: All models include time dummies. There are
883 observations. Significance level indicator : ∗p <
0.05;∗∗ p < 0.1;∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
of random coefficients with micro-moments. Table 1.5 contains two sets of results:
the first set is the parameter of the linear function of λt – the constant term and
the time trend coefficient; the second set contains manufacturer cost shifters. Both
of the service parameters are significant. A positive ψ0 and a negative ψ1 suggest
that service increases the demand, however, its impact subsides over time. For a
new product like the iPhone, special service matters more in the early periods in the
sense that consumers rely more on service for information about the product when
it is relatively new in the market, and less so when the product is more familiar
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to consumers. Given the two coefficients, the service parameter can be constructed
using Equation (1.36). Note that service enters the flow utility, so the overall effect
of service on demand should be the discounted sum of the effect over time. Using
superscript dr as the notation of discounted value, the benefit of service on demand
relative to service costs is declining over time with a mean value 5.71e−5.
Figure 1.8: Wholesale Markup Over Time
Most of the cost coefficients – except for DSDS – have expected signs. Screen size,
battery and CPU all have a significant effect on increasing costs, and screen size seems
to have the most impact among all the cost drivers, increasing cost by 0.71% with a
1% increase in screen size. This matches the results of a bill-of-materials analysis for
an smartphone, in which screen takes up the biggest proportion of the manufacturer
cost. It is surprising to see the DSDS turn out to be an cost reducer, and I could
not explain why the coefficient is negative. Having controlled for the hardware costs,
marginal costs are not substantially different between the six large manufacturers
except for Apple. First stage statistics show high R2 and F − Statistics, suggesting
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the instruments used here are valid. Figure 1.8 shows the recovered wholesale price-
cost markup ratio given the service parameters. The markups overall are constant
with a slight decline over time, and are more volatile for native manufacturers than
foreign. iPhone has the highest wholesale markup, with an average 45% markup over
marginal costs; Samsung has the second highest wholesale markup, which is 7% lower
than iPhone. Native brands have an average markup around 20%, in particular, ZTE
is the lowest of all with an average markup of 13%.
Given the fact that service has a significant effect on increasing demand, this
naturally leads to a discussion on how much we would miscalculate manufacturer costs
if we ignored the service factor. Table 1.6 provides the distribution of manufacturer
costs under two scenarios: with service consideration and without.13 The first block
in the table presents the costs distributions by manufacturer when taking service
into account, and the second block shows the results when we ignore the service
effect. Let us start with the first block. Apple has the highest costs overall of all
smartphone manufacturers. Native brands Coolpad, Huawei and ZTE share similar
costs (all cheaper than Apple, Lenovo and Samsung) and amount to only 1/3 the
costs of iPhones. In addition, Lenovo and Samsung have more product variety than
the other manufacturers. Since all six manufacturers have at least one product on the
market each period, more observations suggest more model varieties. Results from
the second block show that ignoring the service effect leads to an underestimation
of the marginal costs, however, the degree varies greatly between manufacturers.
13Half of the recovered marginal costs found using Equation (1.26) are negative. This is because
consumers would not know how much data they actually need before the contract. Because China
Unicom does not allow for downgrading plans later, it is better to start with the introductory plan
and upgrade as needed. Here I assume all consumers upgrade their data plan by one level after
signing the contract. This is probably an underestimation compared to the upgrading pattern in
reality. Because this extra charge happens after consumers purchase the bundle, it is not included in
the retail price and thus would not affect the price coefficient. Therefore, I add the extra charges to
the recovered marginal costs using manufacturer’s first-order condition, and all the marginal costs
are positive after doing so.
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Neglecting the service factor would not substantially bias the estimated costs for
Coolpad, Huawei, Lenovo and ZTE, however, it will lead to underestimating the
marginal costs for Samsung by almost 2%. Failing to include the service factor will
also cause a significant downward bias for iPhone marginal cost by 7.77%.
Table 1.6: Recovered Costs and Wholesale Markups
Manufacturer Obs. Mean Std. Min Max
Manufacturer Costs (RMB)
Coolpad 92 638 189 151 903
Huawei 94 712 195 443 1, 247
Apple 79 2, 454 573 980 3, 431
Lenovo 102 836 467 318 1, 895
Samsung 116 1, 124 648 433 2, 649
ZTE 74 649 180 320 1, 137
Wholesale Markup Reduction %
Coolpad 0.97 Lenovo 0.86
Huawei 0.81 Samsung 1.54
Apple 5.37 ZTE 0.9
Bias of Costs if Ignore Service %
Coolpad −0.41 Lenovo −0.62
Huawei −0.59 Samsung −1.8
Apple −7.77 ZTE −0.63
Note: All recovered costs include the extra plan charge, which is the dis-
counted sum of upgrading the data plan by one level. Underestimation
percentage represents the mean of percentage of marginal costs being un-
derestimated if one ignores service effect.
On the flip side of the coin, the differences between manufacturer costs with and
without the service factor also reflect the different pricing behaviors when a man-
ufacturer wants to encourage more service from retailers. Theoretically, increasing
the wholesale price will affect service negatively; a higher wholesale price will lead to
a higher retail price, which in turn causes a reduction in sales. Retailers have less
incentive to provide service as the marginal increase in sales from service would not
be as high as if the sales were high. As the results show, a unit increase in wholesale
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price will cause an average 0.15 reduction in service, and the degree is more for manu-
facturers with larger market shares. In particular, such an increase in wholesale price
in the early periods will cause the service for iPhones to reduce by 0.28. With this
said, a manufacturer who wants more service and has a relatively larger market share
should reduce wholesale price more than the manufacturer who does not. Comparing
the two sets of wholesale markups using the recovered marginal costs under the two
scenarios, taking into account retailer’s service optimization will lower the wholesale
markup of iPhone by 5.4%.
One thing worth mentioning is that, if it is given that the manufacturer will lower
the wholesale margin to increase retailer service and that service has less impact
on demand as time goes by, with all else holding constant, we should expect the
wholesale markup ratio to rise for iPhone and Samsung over time. However, from
what is shown in Figure 1.8, the trend for the wholesale markups is rather flat for both
manufacturers. One probable explanation is the increased competition from the rival
native manufacturers. Recall in Figure 1.5, close to the end of the data period, the
sales of native brands surpassed the sales of iPhone, and the increasing competitive
pressure from rival manufacturers prevents Apple from increasing the markup.
The results show that Apple values Unicom’s service much more than any other
manufacturer and is willing to substantially lower the wholesale price to induce more
special service for the iPhone. In this sense, the initial choice of exclusive contract
with Unicom is optimal for Apple; it increases Unicom’s sales on the iPhone and
at the same time eliminates the possibility of rivals free-riding on Unicom’s service.
Both of these advantages give Unicom extra incentive to exert more effort into special
service for the iPhone. However, the benefit of service on demand subsides over time
and when service can no longer significantly increase the demand, continuing the
exclusive contract would no longer be beneficial. If the main purpose of inducing
54
retailer service is to increase the sales , at this stage, assigning more agents would
be more helpful. This could be one potential explanation as to why Apple had an
exclusive contract with China Unicom for two years and six months before forming a
second partnership with China Telecom.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper develops a method to evaluate the role of retailers in determining service,
even when service is not observed. The identification of service comes from the vari-
ation of manufacturer’s wholesale prices, in the sense that retailer’s optimization of
service enters the manufacturer’s first-order condition and thus alters its price setting.
First I construct and estimate a demand model using a panel dataset of price, quan-
tity and characteristics of the ”phone+network” bundle offered by China Unicom, the
second largest wireless carriers in China. The data also provide the wholesale prices
of the phones charged by manufacturers to China Unicom. The demand model allows
for consumers to be forward-looking and with persistent heterogeneous preferences
regarding product characteristics. The estimates of the demand model are then used
in a structural supply model to estimate the service parameters. In the supply model,
the retailer sets both final price and service level after manufacturer determines the
wholesale price.
The demand estimates suggest substantial variations in consumer preferences, and
adding micro-moments yields more sensible results. A static analysis using the same
data provides with less realistic results, suggesting that the use of a dynamic demand
model is important in analyzing consumer purchases of durable goods.
In the service estimation, I find that service has a positive significant effect on
demand, however, the impact subsides over time. Among all the manufacturers,
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Apple values retailer’s service the most and willing to lower wholesale markup by 5%
to induce more retailer service. Other than Apple, China Unicom does not seem to
provide special service for other phone manufacturers. Using the recovered marginal
costs, I find that the iPhone has the greatest wholesale margin given that Apple has
lowered the margin for the service purposes. I also find that ignoring the service effect
will not significantly bias the estimated marginal costs for the native manufacturers,
however, it does cause a substantial downward bias for Apple and Samsung. The
pattern in service thus provides a potential explanation to Apple’s initial exclusive
contract with China Unicom and the subsequent contract arrangement.
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CHAPTER TWO
2.1 Introduction
This paper develops and executes a new method for calculating price-cost margins in
a durable goods environment. We study digital camcorders, a new good during the
time period of the data set. We analyze how margins differ across products, firms
and time. We are particularly interested in the extent to which falling marginal costs
explain falling prices, as opposed to alternative explanations such as intertemporal
price discrimination or increased competition.
Although price-cost margins are an important element of many studies in in-
dustrial organization, margins are challenging to compute because it is unusual to
observe an accurate measure of marginal cost. Rather, researchers typically estimate
marginal cost in the context of a structural model of competition. A popular empir-
ical method associated with Bresnanhan (1981) and Berry et al. (1995) (henceforth,
BLP) proceeds by estimating demand, assuming an equilibrium concept to describe
interactions between firms, and then calculating marginal revenue at each product.
We can interpret the result as marginal cost, as optimizing behavior implies that
marginal revenue equals marginal cost.
However, taking this approach in a dynamic environment brings up substantial
new challenges. In particular, the relevant marginal revenue to consider is a dynamic
one, the change in the present discounted value of the infinite stream of future rev-
enue. For a durable good such as digital camcorders, a price change today affects
future revenue in two ways. First, the price change affects consumer purchases today
and thus affects consumer holdings going forward, which will affect how consumers
make decisions in the future; for instance, low current prices cannibalize future sales.
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Second, the change in consumer holdings affects future pricing by both the firm and
its competitors. Thus, we wish our model to resolve both dynamic-decision making
by consumers, and dynamic strategic interactions among firms.
Estimating dynamic games faces both computational difficulties because of mas-
sive state sizes, and theoretical difficulties because of the likely presence of multiple
equilibria. Recent research in estimating dynamic games with continuous choice vari-
ables, such as Bajari, Benkard & Levin (2007) and Berry & Pakes (2000), provide
two-step approaches that largely resolve these issues for estimating dynamic cost pa-
rameters. However, these methods have a drawback for our purposes: when they
are applied to marginal costs, they do not provide us with the marginal cost that
rationalizes each observed price. Rather, in these approaches, the researcher specifies
marginal cost as a parameterized function and an additive error term, and then uses a
moments or minimum distance estimator to estimate the parameters only. The error
term is not identified by the method.1 If the variance of the error term is substantial
and the parameterized function only partially explains true marginal cost, then we
will calculate erroneous price-cost margins.
Rather, we prefer a method that allows us to calculate the actual price-cost margin
for each product as in BLP. Nevo (2001) is a good example of how a researcher might
use such price-cost margins. Conditional on the demand model, one can interpret
the results as a non-parametric distribution of marginal costs. There is an interesting
parallel with Guerre, Perrigne & Vuong (2000), who analyze an auction setting. In
their paper, they use bids and the probability of winning an auction (analogous to
1In Bajari et al. (2007), the use of a minimum distance estimator with inequalities means we do
not compute a structural error term. Berry & Pakes (2000) observe marginal revenue with error
and integrate out that error in a moments framework, but they never compute marginal revenue
accurately for each observations. For each of these approaches, perhaps it would possible to take their
results and compute exact marginal cost in each period. However, we believe that this computation
would look similar to what we do here.
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prices and demand in an oligopoly setting) to compute a non-parametric distribution
of bidder valuations (analogous to marginal costs). In the spirit of these papers, we
wish to develop a method that generates a non-parametric distribution of marginal
costs.
We assume firms observe their own values of marginal cost and those of their
rivals in the current period, but know only distributions of potential marginal costs
for future periods, and we assume firms play a Markov Perfect Equilibrium. As
we emphasize pricing rather than product introductions, we assume that firms take
the set of products they will produce as exogenous, and that firms have perfect
information about which products will be offered in the future, by both themselves
and their rivals. We use the demand model specified in Gowrisankaran & Rysman
(2012), so consumers start with no camcorder and each period make a discrete choice
over which camcorder to purchase, possibly choosing not to buy and live with their
current holdings. Consumers are heterogenous in a persistent way, as specified by a
set of random coefficients. Consumers have rational expectations about how product
offerings will evolve into the future. An important simplifying assumption allows us to
treat consumer expectations in reduced-form, so we can estimate demand separately
from the supply side.
For estimation, we use the demand parameters estimated in Gowrisankaran &
Rysman (2012). Our method for estimating marginal cost proceeds in two steps.
In the first step, we estimate a reduced-form equation for how firms set prices as a
function of state variables. State variables for a given product are the flow utility
of the product in question, the mean flow utilities and number of products produced
by the firm, and the mean flow utilities and number of products produced by rivals.
These state variables are inspired by the instrumental variables that are popularized
in BLP. Furthermore, we add summaries of consumer holdings as state variables, such
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as the percent of consumers that have purchased the good.
In the second step, our goal is to compute the distribution of marginal costs that
each firm expects for each product. For computational purposes, we assume time ends
at some period after the end of the data in our sample. In this last period, we draw
a set of prices for each product based on the state variables in that period and the
first-stage price regression function. For each set of prices, we compute the market
share and the resulting market share from adjusting one price by a small amount,
say 5%. Thus, we compute a matrix of market share derivatives, which we can use
to compute marginal cost as in BLP. We do this for each draw of price in the last
period, thus computing the distribution of marginal costs.
Going to the previous period, we once again compute changes in sales from changes
in price. In addition, for each change in price in the penultimate period, we compute
the resulting change in state variables in the final period and the change in profits
in this final period. Thus, we have the change in sales in the current period and
the change in expected profits in the future period. We show that these are the two
elements we need to compute marginal cost in the dynamic analog to the first-order
condition in BLP. Thus, we compute marginal cost for each draw of price in the
second-to-last period. We proceed recursively, in each period computing the change
in sales and the change in the present discounted value of the future stream of profits
for each draw of prices.
As a result, we have the distribution of marginal costs for each product in each
period. It is then straightforward to substitute in our algorithm the observed price
for the draws of price and compute the marginal cost that rationalizes each price in
the data set. Overall, our method draws on the two-step approach of Bajari et al.
(2007) and the inversion of the first-order condition in BLP to compute marginal
cost for each product in a dynamic oligopoly environment. In practice, we compute
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marginal cost only for the four firms that produce in every period of our data (Canon,
JVC, Panasonic and Sony). While our method could be applied to firms that have
products in a subset of periods, doing so raises some interpretation questions and we
argue that those firms are of little empirical importance.
We find that our first stage regression fits the data well and that the coefficients
have sensible signs. We find that our second-stage computation works well in rea-
sonable amounts of time. However, we find that dynamic considerations have little
impact on our estimates of marginal cost. In our model, the only way that price
today affects future profits is through consumer holdings. But the affect of consumer
holdings on the future state is diffused across all products and firms, and so has little
effect for any one firm. Interestingly, although dynamics on the consumer side are
shown to be important in Gowrisankaran & Rysman (2012), they are still of little
importance in explaining the supply side. We find that price-cost margins change
little over time. This might be surprising given the number of entrants goes from 4
to as high as 11. However, the market shares of the big-4 firms remains high over
time and entrants appear to be of little importance. Thus, our results suggest a
limited role for inter-temporal price discrimination and increasing competition in our
context. This conflicts with conventional wisdom about consumer electronics, which
holds that high introductory prices are meant to skim surplus from early adopters.
Rather, we ascribe most of the fall in prices to falling marginal cost.2
In our environment, it is natural to consider the Coase conjecture Coase (1972);
Stokey (1979), which says that durable goods monopolists facing perfectly patient
2Note that we are referring to exogenous drops in marginal cost. A common suggestion we hear
is that learning-by-doing might be important, which would be an endogenous drop in marginal cost.
However, Spence (1981) shows in a simple model that a monopolist with perfect information sets
constant prices in the face of learning-by-doing. Benkard (2004) does not take on this question
explicitly, but we read those results to say that even in an oligopoly environment with uncertainty,
prices do not necessarily fall over time with learning-by-doing. For instance, eyeing Figures 5 and 6
in that paper, it appears that price drops are driven more by entry than falling prices.
61
consumers should set price equal to marginal cost. In contrast, we find mark-ups of
around 50%. Our model deviates from the Coase conjecture in several dimensions.
In addition to the fact that consumers are not perfectly patient, our model also has
that consumers draw idiosyncratic shocks each period, which gives them high demand
that will not persist, which can lead a firm to raise price Biehl (2001), Also, in our
model, consumers may purchase repeatedly. Other issues that might be important
are the multi-product nature of firms, that future marginal cost is uncertain, and that
consumers are uncertain about future prices.
2.2 Model
We begin by describing our model of firms. The next subsection describes our speci-
fication of consumer demand.
2.2.1 Firms
It is not crucial to understand the details of our demand model in order to have under-
stand how our computation of marginal cost works. For purposes of explicating the
firm’s problem, keep in mind that consumers are long-lived and products are durable,
so that a consumer that purchases in the current period is unlikely to purchase in
the next period, although repeat purchase is allowed in our model. Consumers are
characterized by holdings Ht, which captures the set of consumers that have not
purchased and the quality of holdings of consumers that have purchased.3
There are F firms indexed by f = 1, . . . , F . Time is discrete and infinite. Firms
discount the next period at rate β. In each period, there are Jt products available.
Firm f produces all products j ∈ Fft in period t. Each firm knows Fft for all f and
3In our empirical implementation, Ht is discretized into a matrix denoting the share of each type
of consumer holding each possible flow utility level, including the share of each type of consumer
that has not purchased.
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t, and takes these elements as exogenous. Each product is characterized by a mean
flow utility, further described below, and a marginal cost mcjt. In each period, each
firm chooses price pjt for each product j ∈ Fft.
There is a measure of consumers M . The share of consumers purchasing product
j in period t is sjt(Pt, Ht), where Ht describes consumer holdings at the beginning of
period t and Pt denotes the vector of all prices. Thus, profit to firm j in period t is:
pijt =
∑
j∈Fft
(pjt −mcjt)Msjt(Pt, Ht)
We assume that consumer holdings evolve according to the process Ht+1 =
g1(St, Pt,Ω
c
t). The variable Ω
c
t captures any relevant consumer state variables, such
as the set of products available in t. We discuss consumer state variables in detail
below.
We denote the set of state variables for the firm as Ω̂t. The state variables consist
of the vector of marginal costs for all products in period t, the entire vector of current
and future values of flow utility generated by every product (own and competitor)
and consumer holdings Ht. The state variable evolves according to Ω̂t+1 = g2(Pt, Ω̂t).
In period t, the value function for firm f is:
V (Ω̂ft) = max
Pft
E
 ∞∑
τ=t
∑
j∈Ffτ
(pjτ −mcjτ )Msjτ (Sτ , Pτ )
∣∣∣∣∣∣ Ω̂ft
 .
We assume firms play a Markov Perfect Equlibrium. The first-order condition for
product j owned by firm f is:
sjt(St, Pt) +
∑
k∈Fft
(pkt −mckt) ∂skt(St, Pt)
∂pjt
+ β
∂
∂pjt
E
[
Vf (Ω̂ft+1)|Ω̂ft, Pt
]
= 0. (2.1)
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2.2.2 Demand
In this subsection, we describe our model of demand. We follow the model in
Gowrisankaran & Rysman (2012) exactly. We refer readers there for a more de-
tailed discussion. This subsection may be skipped by readers with familiarity with
that paper.
Briefly, consumers start time with no product and make a discrete choice each pe-
riod over which product to purchase, possibly choosing not to purchase. Purchasing a
product obtains the consumer a flow utility ever after. That is, products are infinitely
durable. Consumers may purchase again, in which case they scrap their current prod-
uct for no value. We restrict consumers to form expectations of the future value of
purchase based on a reduced-form approximation of how their own utility of purchase
will evolve, but consumers have rational expectations conditional on this restriction.
Consumers are characterized by random coefficients on flow utility and price. These
coefficients are constant over time, so consumers exhibit persistent heterogeneity.
Let i index consumers. Consumers start time with with no product. Each period,
consumers may choose to purchase one of the Jt products available, or choose not
to purchase. The mean flow utility of product j in period t to consumer i is δfijt.
The superscript “f” refers to flow. Gowrisankaran & Rysman (2012) denote δfijt as
fijt. However, we reserve f to denote firms in this paper. Consumer i that purchases
product j in period t obtains flow utility:
uijt = δ
f
ijt − αi ln(pjt) + εijt.
The variable εijt is distributed iid according to the Extreme Value distribution. There
is a slight abuse of notation in that we assume that there is a continuum of consumers
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with draws εijt for each i. Thus, it is better to think of a δ
f
ijt and αi as a consumer
type rather than a consumer.
In practice, we assume that δfijt = δ
f
jt + σ1νi1 and that αi = α + σ2νi2, where νi1
and νi2 are distributed according to the standard normal, and the parameters α, σ1
and σ2 are to be estimated. Thus, δ
f
jt represents mean flow utility. This is a random
coefficients model with random coefficients only on the constant term and price. This
is the main specification in Gowrisankaran & Rysman (2012).
We now turn to dynamics. The consumer has two state variables. The first
describes the product that the consumer holds, and the second describes what is
available on the market. The first state variable, which we denote as δ0it, is the flow
utility of the product that the consumer has already purchased. Thus, all consumers
start with δ0i0 = 0. If the consumer’s first purchase is at time t, then δ
0
iτ = 0 for τ < t
and δ0iτ = δ
f
it for τ ≥ t, until the time of the second purchase.
Given the logit shock to utility, the expected value of making a purchase in any
given period has a convenient closed-form solution: the logit inclusive value. In
addition, the consumer must make predictions about how the market will evolve in the
future. In particular, the consumer must make predictions about future logit inclusive
values. Formally, the consumer should rely on the entire set of products available on
the market and any other information that might be helpful in predicting future
decisions by firms. However, doing so leads to a large state space that is numerically
intractable.
We make an important simplifying assumption, which Gowrisankaran & Rysman
(2012) refer to as Inclusive Value Sufficiency (IVS). IVS states that the consumer
predicts future inclusive values using only the current inclusive value. Thus, the
inclusive value is sufficient not only for capturing the value of purchasing in the
current period, but also for predicting future values of purchase. As a result, the
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consumer state space consists of only two scalar variables, the flow utility of holdings
and the current inclusive value of purchase. Gowrisankaran & Rysman (2012) provide
extensive discussion of how IVS might be motivated, as well as theoretical analysis,
Monte Carlo analysis and empirical analysis in our data set. They conclude that IVS
fits the data well and is well supported. Gowrisankaran & Rysman (2012) provide
further theoretical analysis, and compare IVS to alternative assumptions that might
be used.
Thus, the expected value of purchasing in period t for consumer i is the inclusive
value:
δit = ln
∑
j∈Jt
exp
(
δfijt + βE
[
V ci (δ
f
ijt, δit+1)
∣∣∣ δit]) . (2.2)
The function V ci is the value function for a consumer (before realizing draws of
εijt), and the term δ
f
ijt in the value function denotes that if the consumer buys j,
we know the flow utility going forward is δfijt. More generally, the consumer value
function (now dropping t since the consumer problem is stationary) is:
V ci (δ
0
i , δi) = ln
(
exp(δi) + exp
(
δ0i + βE
[
V ci (δ
0
i , δit+1)
∣∣ δit])) . (2.3)
The second term in the exponent is the value of waiting (and thus experiencing flow
utility δ0i ).
The expectation over V c requires the consumer to form expectations of δit+1. To
implement IVS, we assume the consumer believes that δit follows an AR1 process.
That is, consumers believe:
δit+1 = γ0i + γ1iδit + ηit. (2.4)
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In practice, we estimate the coefficients γ0i and γ1i, as well as the variance of shocks
σηi , from the realized values of δit. Thus, our consumers have rational expectations
within the set of our functional forms.
Given a value function V ci , a set of expectations {γ0i, γ1i, σηi }, a vector of mean flow
utilities δfijt and price parameter αi, we can calculate the share of type i consumers
that purchase each product in each period. Thus, we can track the holdings of each
type of consumer over the evolution of consumer products. Gowrisankaran & Rysman
(2012) detail this process.
We can add up consumer purchases across consumer types to find the overall
share of each product in each period predicted by the model, which we denote ŝjt.
We also observe this value in data, which we denote s∗jt. In order to find the vector
of flow utilities that rationalizes the observed market shares, we solve the fixed point
equation:
δ
f
jt = δ
f
jt + ln(s
∗
jt)− ln(ŝ∗jt) (2.5)
Thus, for any set of parameter values {σ1, σ2, αp}, we solve simultaneously for V ci ,
{γ0i, γ1i, σνi }, δit, δ
f
jt by iterating between equations 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5. The solutions
do not all have closed forms, so we simulate consumer draws i. Note that for variables
denoted by i, we solve for separate values for each i. Thus, if we draw 100 types of
consumers, we must solve for 100 value functions and expectations. In practice, we
discretize the state space, and so convert the AR1 parameters to a discrete transition
matrix following Tauchen (1986).
Based on this solution, we can compute consumer holdings for the observed path
of prices, and how purchases and holdings respond to deviations from those prices,
which we use in calculating marginal cost.
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2.3 Computing Marginal Cost
Our method proceeds in two steps. In the first-step, we estimate reduced-form equa-
tions that describe how observable state variables map into prices. In the second step,
we simulate from the reduced-form results to compute the future outcomes in order
to compute marginal cost.
2.3.1 Step 1
Let Ωt equal Ω̂t but for the marginal costs. That is, Ωt consists of the state variables
that are observable to the econometrician. We specify a function ψ that maps the
state space Ωt and an appropriate distributed random variable into Pt, a vector of
prices in period t. Thus, Pt = ψ(Ωt, Ut), where Ut is the vector of random draws
for all products in t. Our first step consists of estimating the function ψ and the
distribution of ujt (the draw for each product j).
2.3.2 Step 2
Our goal is to compute marginal revenue for each product in order to construct a
first-order condition. In order to compute marginal revenue for any period, we must
know the impact on profits going forward, so we must know the future distribution
of marginal cost in all future periods. In order to proceed by backward induction,
we assume that the firm lives for a finite set of periods T , rather than infinite set of
periods. We do not need to make this assumption for consumers. So even in period
T , we assume that consumers believe the market will continue to evolve according
the to process in Equation 2.4.
We begin by drawing ns values of usjt, s = 1, . . . , ns for all products in all time
periods. The distribution for usjt is derived from a first-stage price regression. Let U
s
t
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be vector of draws in period t for sample s = 1, . . . , ns.
We proceed by backward induction. We begin with period T . We use the state
observed in the data along with the random draws to compute simulated prices. That
is, we compute P sT = ψ(ΩT , U
s
T ). We utilize the final period first-order condition:
sjT (P
s
T , HT ) +
∑
k∈FfT
(pskT −mcskT )
∂skT (P
s
T , HT )
∂psjT
= 0.
Let Sft(Pt, Ht) be the Jft × 1 vector of market shares for products controlled by
firm f in period t. Similarly, define MCft and Pft as the vectors of marginal cost and
prices for firm f in period t. Let Λft be the matrix ∂Sft/∂Pft. Note that all elements
of Λft are different than zero, as it is defined only over products owned by f . Then,
we rewrite the period T first-order condition in matrix notation:
P sfT + Λ
s,−1
fT SfT (P
s
T , Ht) = MC
s
fT . (2.6)
In practice, we compute as following. The vector P st is computed from ψ as described
above. For any given vector P st , we compute market share SfT (P
s
t , Ht). In this
computation, we assume that consumers still solve the GR infinite horizons durable
goods problem.4 We move each price by a small amount, say 5%, and recompute
market shares. We then compute ΛsfT as ∆skT/∆p
s
jT . We plug the result into 2.6 and
thus compute the vector of marginal costs in the final period for each firm for each
draw s. Doing so over all draws s provides us with the distribution of marginal costs
in the final period.
Now consider period T − 1. The first-order condition for product j for each draw
4Thus, sjt(P
s
t , Ht) depends only on P
s
t , the vector of mean utilities in period t (fjt) and utility
parameters, and does not depend on t. The subscript t substitutes for writing out the dependence
on consumer state variables Ωct .
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s in period T − 1 is:
sjT−1(P sT−1, HT−1) +
∑
k∈FfT−1
(
pskT−1 −mcskT−1
) ∂skT−1(P sT−1, HT−1)
∂psjT−1
+ β
∂
∂psjT−1
E
[
Vf (ΩfT )|ΩsfT−1, P sT−1
]
= 0.
To compute mcsjT−1, we again compute the distribution of prices P
s
T−1 =
ψ(ΩT−1, U sT−1). We compute market shares SjT−1(P
s
T−1, HT−1) based on the GR de-
mand system. Thus, for each draw s, we have a new set of final period state variables
ΩsT , which includes holdings H
s
T . For each Ω
s
T , we compute a new vector of prices in
the last period PmsT = ψ(Ω
s
T , U
m
T ) for m = 1, . . . , ns. Thus, we ultimately compute
a set of ns2 prices for period T (a vector of ns prices in period T for each draw of
the ns prices in period T − 1). Based on these prices, we compute market shares
sjT (P
ms
T , H
s
T ). Thus, we are able to compute the expected continuation value:
E
[
Vf (ΩfT )|ΩsfT−1, P sT−1
]
=
1
ns
ns∑
m=1
∑
j∈FfT
(pmskT −mcmkT ) skT (PmsT , HsT )
This is the expectation over future draws of marginal cost. We can compute a separate
expected continuation value for each draw of current price s.
This is a good moment to review the key ideas in our approach. We have a set of
ns draw of shocks U st for each period. In the last period, we use these to compute ns
prices and thus, ns values of marginal cost. Think of each vector of marginal costs
MCsT as being assigned to draws U
s
T in our procedure. In period T − 1, we again
compute a distribution of prices. However, we must now compute expected profit,
which requires integrating over future prices and marginal costs. For each draw of
prices in T − 1, we re-use the entire set of draws in T to perform this integration.
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Naturally, each draw of price in T − 1 implies different holdings going into T , and
thus the same values of U sT will lead to different prices. However, we assume that
marginal cost is the same – whatever was associated with U sT . Thus, for each draw s
of prices in T −1, we compute a new state space ΩsT . To perform the integration over
the final period, we denote final period draws by m rather than s to distinguish them
from period T − 1 draws. Thus, we use UmT to generate an entire set of ns new prices
P smT . For each vector of prices P
sm
T , we know marginal cost MC
m
T , we can compute
market shares, and thus we can compute a distribution of profits resulting from P sT−1.
Returning to our method, we actually need derivatives of market shares and
prices, and so for each draw and product, we adjust price psjT−1 by 5% and re-
compute outcomes in T − 1 and T . We then compute ∆skT−1(P sT−1)/∆psjT−1 and
∆E
[
Vf (ΩfT )|ΩsfT−1, P sT−1
]
/∆psjT−1 to substitute for the derivatives in the first-order
condition. The computation of marginal cost in matrix formulation is:
P sfT−1+Λ
s,−1
fT−1
(
SfT−1(P sfT−1, HT−1) + β
∂
∂P sfT−1
E
[
Vf (ΩfT )|ΩsfT−1, P sT−1
])
= MCsfT−1.
Note that the matrix ΛsfT−1 contains cross-price derivatives only for products owned
by firm f in period T − 1, not in period T . We need to take expectations over period
T , and so those appear in the derivative of the continuation value.
For period t < T , the computation is similar. The term Ωt is observed in data.
We compute P st = ψ(Ωt, U
s
t ) for each draw s. For each price p
s
jt, we compute the
associated marginal cost mcsjt from the first-order condition:
sjt(P
s
t ) +
∑
k∈Fft
(pskt −mcskt)
∂skt(P
s
t )
∂psjt
+ β
∂
∂psjt
E
[
Vf (Ωft+1)|Ωsft, P st
]
= 0.
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To use this equation, compute market shares St(P
s
t , Ht) for each draw of prices. Doing
so generates a distribution of state variables for t+1, Ωst+1. For each s, we compute a
distribution of prices P smt+1 = ψ(Ω
s
t+1, U
m
t+1). We then compute a distribution of market
shares for t+1, St+1(P
sm
t+1, H
s
t+1), which generates a distribution of state variables Ω
sm
t+2
(incorporating holdings Hsmt+1. We proceed in this way until we have computed the
outcomes for the final period P smT and ST (P
sm
T , H
sm
T ). The expected continuation
value for each price psjt is:
E
[
Vf (Ωft+1)|Ωsft, P st
]
=
T∑
τ=t+1
1
ns
ns∑
m=1
∑
j∈Ffτ
βτ−t−1 (pmskτ −mcmkτ ) skτ (Pmsτ , Hmsτ )
We alter each price psjt by 1% and redo this computation in order to compute the
derivative of the market share in t and the derivative of the continuation value. Then,
the matrix notation for the marginal cost from draw s in product j in period t is:
P sft + Λ
s,−1
ft
(
Sft(P
s
ft) + β
∂
∂P sft
E
[
Vf (Ωft+1)|Ωsft, P st
])
= MCsft. (2.7)
In this way, we derive the distribution of marginal costs for each product in each
period. We may instead be interested in the realized marginal cost for each product,
the marginal cost that would rationalize the observed prices. To compute the realized
vector of marginal costs for firm f in period t, we recompute Equation 2.7 substituting
observed prices for P sft. Note that we still use simulated prices for periods t + 1 and
beyond, as firms have uncertainty about these in our model.
Now, we briefly discuss how our solution relates to our assumptions. An important
assumption is that firms know current period marginal costs for all firms but not for
future periods. One alternative would be to let firms know future marginal cost
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for every period. In this environment, if the researcher could observe future prices,
we could calculate all future marginal costs in a single inversion with a multiperiod
version of Equation 2.7. Just as BLP solve for all current period marginal costs
simultaneously, we could solve for all current and future marginal costs simultaneously
under an assumption of perfect information. However, doing so would require us to
compute the derivative of future market shares from a price change today. It would
be difficult to utilize the simulate approach that we use here since there would be
no randomness under a perfect information assumption. Rather, one would have to
solve the entire dynamic model, which appears to be practically infeasible.
Another alterative would be to give the firms asymmetric information in the cur-
rent period, so they know their own marginal cost but not those of their competitors.
That is a standard assumption in the literature around Bajari et al. (2007), which
uses simulation to address future and current competitor choices. That would mean
simulating over competitor choices to compute Λsft. We do not have strong views
on whether this would preferably and, although it is more complicated, it certainly
appears feasible. One issue is that it takes us farther from BLP, on which our solution
is based.
2.4 Data
Our data set is exactly the same as in Gowrisankaran & Rysman (2012). Our data
set is primarily supplied by NPD Techworld, which has relationships with retailers
from which it draws sales and price data. NPD does not cover on-line retailers such
as Amazon, or WalMart. We observe sales and average price of camcorders at the
level of the model for each month from March 2000 to May 2006. March 2000 is
close to the practical start of this market. We aggregate some models, such as models
73
that contain the same camcorder but different accessories (so-called “kits”). In these
cases, we use the lower price. We drop observations for which we observe less than
100 units of sales in a month. We drop models with price less than $100 or greater
than $2000. We collected data on product characteristics model-by-model from on-
line resources. We collect characteristics such as pixel count, which measures the
resolution of the shot, size of the camcorder (actually, width times depth) and series
of indicators for various features, such as night shot, lamp and photo capability. We
observe 383 models and 11 brands, over 4,436 month-model observations.
In our work, we emphasize the “big 4” firms: Canon, JVC, Panasonic and Sony.
They are the only firms to sell camcorders in every period of our data set. Figure 2.1
graphs their number of models by month. We can see that within these four, Sony
stands out as consistently leading the market in terms of number of products. But
all four are large, almost always with five models on the market, and typically in the
teens. Sony is typically in the twenties, with a high of 31 models in a month.
The “Next 3” are Hitachi, Samsung and Sharp. Figure 2.2 shows their number
of models by month. Sharp produces from the start but rarely produces more than
5 models and drops out by early 2005. In contrast, Hitachi and Samsung do not
start producing until mid-2002 and mid-2001 respectively, but then continue to pro-
duce until the end of our data set. Even so, they never produce more than seven
models, and typically produce four or five. The remaining for hardware producers
are AIPTEK, DXG, Fisher and RCA. These firms are in our data set for only a few
months and produce one or two models when they are in. They account for 42 ob-
servations altogether. While there is no technical problem with applying our model
to firms that are not in the data set every period, doing so does raise some questions
of interpretation. In particular, we assume perfect foresight about the number of
products produced, but why would a firm enter if it knew it was going to drop out in
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Figure 2.1: Number of Models: “Big 4”
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a month or two? Our model could be more sensibly applied to Hitachi and Samsung,
which produce until the end of the data set, but at this point, we apply our model
only to the “big 4.”
Figure 2.3 graphs market shares by time for the big four firms. Sony’s importance
is even more apparent in this graph. Sony controls as much as 75% of the market.
Although Sony loses market share over time, it still controls between 40% and 60%
of the market throughout our data set. The rest of the three firms hover below 20%
each. Naturally, this leaves very little market share for the remaining seven firms.
The remaining firms combined obtain 5% of the market for the first time in mid-2002
and almost never obtain more than 15% market share.
We also present average price over time. This is a simple average counting each
product equally. In Figure 2.4, all four firms display consistently falling prices. Prices
seems similar across the firms. In contrast to its high quantity, Sony is never the
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Figure 2.2: Number of Models: “Next 3”
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Figure 2.3: Market Shares by Month.
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Figure 2.4: Average Price by Month
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lowest price firm, and is often the highest priced firm on average. Clearly, it will be
important to model quality.
For the big four firms, products stay on the market an average of 14 months, so it is
clear that seeing price fall over six years means that price fall across model. However,
price also falls within models. That is, the age profile of prices within a model is
strongly negative. To show this, we regress the natural log of price on a set of age
dummies, where age is defined as the calendar month minus the month of introduction
in our data set. We include month fixed effects and product fixed effects.5 We graph
coefficients on month for the first 12 months, which can be interpreted loosely as
percentage declines in price. Thus, in Figure 2.5, we see that price is more than 30%
5Note that this regression is not identified in the sense that age is collinear the combination of
calendar and model fixed effects. We normalize one month to have a coefficient of zero. While this
is not completely satisfactory, this issue is not central to our paper so we do not further explore here
it here. See Mehta, Rysman & Simcoe (2010) for a more comprehensive treatment in the context of
patent citations.
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Figure 2.5: Coefficients from Regression of Price on Age Dummies
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lower a year after introduction. While that explains only a part of the overall price
decline, it certainly is significant.
2.5 Results
We first discuss our first-step regressions of price on state variables. Then we turn to
the second step, which computes marginal costs, in part by using the first-step results
to predict future prices.
2.5.1 Step One
We wish to regress the price of each product on state variables that predict that
price. In practice, the state space that we specify in our theoretical model is too
large to be useful for these purposes. Instead, we pick a reduced set of variables
to proxy for the state space. We are motivated in our choice by instrument vectors
utilized in BLP and the literature that follows. As in our model, they take product
characteristics as exogenous and predict prices with product characteristics, averages
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics for Step 1 Variables. (N=4436)
Variable Measurement Mean Std. Min Max
Product-level variable
Product quality Mean flow utility of product. 0.0008 0.045 -0.12 0.09
Firm-level variables
Firm average product quality Average of mean flow utilities 0.0015 0.022 -0.11 0.06
of products owned by the firm
excluding product in question.
Firm size Number of products firm owns 13.75 6.2 1 31
Market-level variables
Market average product quality Average of mean flow utilities 0.0008 0.006 -0.19 0.2
of all products in market
excluding product in question.
Market size Number of products in market. 62.56 13.95 27 98
Consumer holdings Percentage of the population 0.045 0.03 0 0.1
have purchased the good.
of product characteristics across own and rival products, as well as counts of own
and rival products. Our situation is somewhat different than theirs in that we have
already computed mean utility for each product (as part of our demand estimation),
whereas they specify instruments in the context of an algorithm that is computing
mean utility for each product. Thus, we can utilize mean utility as a predictor of
price, rather than the underlying product characteristics.
Therefore, we specify price for each product as a function of the product’s mean
flow utility δ
f
jt, as well as the averages of δ
f
jt across own and rival products. Under our
specification of demand, underlying product characteristics should have no ability to
predict prices conditional on observing δ
f
jt. This results from the fact that we specify
a logit demand function with random coefficients on only the constant term and price.
If we extended random coefficients to other characteristics, then those characteristics
should be included in the price regressions since pricing would depend on how close
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other products are in those characteristics. In addition, we include counts of own
and rival products, since these variables should predict price-cost margins. We also
include fixed effects for each firm, as appear in the utility function and instrument
vector in Gowrisankaran & Rysman (2012).
We must also include a measure of consumer holdings. We can solve our demand
model and compute the implied consumer holdings for each period across different
consumer types. Thus, we can include fairly complex measures of consumer holdings.
However, we use only the share of all consumers that hold the good. We experimented
with including more variables, such as the average flow utility of consumer holdings,
but these did very little. Perhaps this is related to the fact that in our demand
specification, we find very little repeat purchase (see Gowrisankaran & Rysman, 2012),
so the share of consumers holding any good is much more important to the firm than
the quality of what they hold.
Table 2.2 presents the results. The main results are in column 1. The dependent
variable is the natural log of price. We find that one unit increase in product qual-
ity (δ
f
jt) increases price by about 7 percent, roughly 33 US dollars. While the two
firm-level variables are positive, the count of firm products is statistically significant
whereas the effect of average quality is not. Estimates of both market product quality
and the total number of products on the market are negative and significant. The
effect of consumer holdings is negative, and the effect is both statistically and eco-
nomically significant. The estimate suggests that a one percent increase in consumer
holding decreases price by almost 10 percent, roughly 52 US dollars. Standard errors
are clustered at the level of the firm, Overall, all estimates present expected signs and
R2 shows model fits data well. Column 2 presents a random effects estimator, but
the results are similar.
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Table 2.2: Reduced-Form Price Regression
Dependent variable: logprice
Random Effect Fixed Effect
(1) (2)
Variable Coefficient Std. Coefficient Std.
Product quality 6.65∗∗∗ (0.21) 6.62∗∗∗ (0.1)
Firm average product quality 0.56 (0.65) 0.48 (0.33)
Firm size 0.013∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.013∗∗∗ (0.002)
Market average product quality −2.8∗∗∗ (0.95) −2.66∗∗∗ (0.94)
Market size −0.003∗∗∗ (0.001) −0.003∗∗∗ (0.001)
Consumer holdings −9.61∗∗∗ (0.25) −9.6∗∗∗ (0.3)
Constant 6.68∗∗∗ (0.06) 6.18∗∗∗ (0.06)
Observations 4,436 4,436
Adjusted R2 0.641 0.662
Residual Std. Error 0.32 0.32
F statistic 774.27∗∗∗(df = 16; 4419)
Wald Chi2 28529.85∗∗∗(df = 6)
Note: ∗p < 0.1;∗∗ p < 0.05;∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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2.5.2 Step Two
We set T = 100. Thus, we add 25 periods to our data set. We do so as follows. First,
we assume that product characteristics in the last period simply repeat themselves
25 times. We still need to compute prices and consumer holdings. For each period
starting with t = 76, we predict prices into the next period based on the results
Section 2.5.1, assuming there is no error term. Then we construct consumer holdings
based on our demand model, and then repeat the process to period T . Adding only
25 periods may seem relatively low given other papers in the tradition of Bajari
et al. (2007) often simulate forward several hundred periods. However, we have an
issue which is that after 25 periods, we start to see consumer holdings jump up
significantly, which causes price to significantly drop, which causes holdings to jump
further. We often find negative prices at time periods much past 100. We take
this as an indication that it is difficult to design first-step regressions that can be
extrapolated too far outside of the data, rather than as a more serious underlying
problem with our approach. We plan to experiment with different values of T , at
least within a small range. However, as we find dynamics are relatively unimportant
even for the first few periods of the data (when there are many periods in the data
following), it seems unlikely that the value of T is very important.
In our demand system, we discretize δit into 100 values, which is substantially
higher than what Gowrisankaran & Rysman (2012) use in demand estimation. We
discretize δ0it into 20 values, plus an extra for δ
0
it = 0. We draw 50 consumers for com-
puting demand. We set β = 0.99 for consumers and firms, as we work with monthly
data. For the firms, we set ns = 32, so we follow 32 price paths to construct expecta-
tions. Note that our problem is conducive to parallel processing: We can parallelize
across the ns draws synchronously, and across firms in asynchronous manner (also
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Figure 2.6: Average Marginal Cost by Period and Firm
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referred to as an embarrasingly parallel manner).
Figure 2.6 shows the simple average of marginal cost across products, for each
firm and month in the data. We stop at period 75, the last period for which we
have data. Marginal cost falls dramatically, from a range around $600 to $700 to
a range between $200 and $300 for most firms. Sony and Canon typically have the
highest marginal cost, but the differences are not enormous. Figure 2.7 displays the
price-margin, pjt/mcjt. Margins fall slightly over time, and Sony typically has the
highest margin. However, differences are not enormous. The margin ranges between
about 1.52 and 1.6 for all of the firm-month observations.
An interesting consideration is how important dynamics are in determining prices.
For each product-month, we compute marginal cost leaving out the term
β ∂
∂P sft
E
[
Vf (Ωft+1)|Ωsft, P st
]
in Equation 2.7. That is, we use the static first-order
condition. We refer to the results as the static marginal cost. Note that we do this for
each price we observe separately, holding the rest of the marginal costs constant at
the level computed from Equation 2.7 incorporating dynamics, so that small changes
late in the sample do not magnify changes in other parts of the data.
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Figure 2.7: Average Price-Cost Margin by Period and Firm
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We take the difference between static and dynamic marginal costs, and compute
the average for each firm and month. The results appear in Figure 2.8. We find very
small differences, typically less than $1. Note that Sony exhibits a slightly larger value,
starting around $5 and declining to between $2 and $3 over time. Presumably, Sony is
an outlier because of its large market share. For the other firms, lowering price today
may steal demand from the future through its affect on consumer holdings. However,
all firms suffer from that effect, so each individual firm sees little effect. Sony is the
only one with a large enough market share to feel the effects of this. Even for Sony,
the effect is not large. That may be due to the fact that the outside option still has
the most substantial market share.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper develops and executes a new method for calculating price-cost margins
in a durable goods environment. We study the industry of digital camcorders from
2000 to 2006. We analyze how margins differ across products, firms and time. We
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Figure 2.8: Average Difference between Static and Dynamic Marginal Costs
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are particularly interested in the extent to which falling marginal costs explain falling
prices, as opposed to alternative explanations such as intertemporal price discrimi-
nation or increased competition. Using demand estimates and the new method, we
generate non-parametric distribution of marginal costs that each firm expects for
each product. We show that marginal cost falls dramatically, from an average of
500toapproximately200. The price-cost margin is strongly correlated with quality,
and is substantially larger for Sony than other firms. We also find that market share
is an important driver for the dynamic considerations in our model.
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CHAPTER THREE
3.1 Introduction
In this paper, I provide a framework for examining firms’ price adjustment processes,
particularly interested in the micro-level determinants of the frequency of the price
changes. Using new data containing wholesale prices from China Unicom, China’s
second largest wireless carrier, I construct and estimate a model of discrete-time
survival analysis, where the dependent variable is the probability of the occurrence
of a price change on the condition that the price has not already adjusted. The fact
that I observe multiple price adjustments for a smartphone model makes it necessary
to also consider the case of repeated price adjustments, where the dependent variable
becomes the probability of the occurrence of a price change conditional on its last
change. Taking advantage of observing both retail prices and wholesale prices, I
further examine the extent to which retail price change behaviors are explained by
wholesale prices changes, both in timing and sizing.
This paper brings new empirical evidence of firm’s pricing process in three ways.
First, it provides a simple tractable method of predicting price empirically. Although
firms’ pricing decisions have been widely studied and theoretical literature have of-
fered many attractive predictions of firms’ pricing processes under different market
scenarios, these predictions are under very restrictive assumptions. In practice, the
pricing process is much more complicated and industry specific, which greatly lim-
its the predicting power of theoretical models. This paper provides a fairly simple
method of using reduced-form regressions. The choice of regressors are inspired by
the instrumental variables in Berry et al. (1995), which are the variables that asso-
ciated with firms’ market power. In particular, instead of using observed product
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characteristics to approximate product quality, I use the indirect utility that is previ-
ously computed as a measure for product quality. It is important to properly control
for the correlations between unobserved product characteristics and the regressors;
otherwise, the coefficients are substantially biased in both sign and magnitude. A
particularly interesting finding is that the age of a product is positively correlated
with price, having controlled for time and product effects. One explanation is that
upon introduction, quality is unknown to both consumers and firms. If a product is
revealed to be popular, firms raise price and keep selling it longer, so that the age
variable is capturing something about the revealed unobserved quality.
Second, this paper fills a gap in empirical literature on price adjustments from a
micro-level standpoint. The traditional model would imply that firms adjust price
constantly, but in reality, we only observe discrete price changes from time to time.
Thus, it questions to the literature as to why prices stay fixed and when they theoret-
ically adjust? As for the first question, also known as the “sticky price phenomenon”,
theoretical studies have developed into two streams. One stream of literature explains
it as a lagged response of price to changes in the fundamentals, which could be due to
physical barriers of adjusting production or inventories in the short-term or due to the
gradual processing of information (Rotemberg (1982); Borenstein & Shepard (2002);
Sims, C. A. (1998)). The other stream instead takes a discrete standpoint of explain-
ing the price adjustment, suggesting that price changes occasionally to the constantly
changing fundamentals. Literature under this stream offers three explanations. The
most popular one is the “menu-cost model” such that there incurs physical costs every
time firms change posted prices (Barro (1972); Dixit (1991)). Another explanation is
the discrete arrival of market information (Calvo (1983)), where firms have limited
knowledge of the market either because some random shocks mask the true state of
nature or a decision has to be made before the realization of relating information.
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The third explanation, and probably the most important, is the uncertainty about
the response by consumers and competitors if the price changes (Rotemberg (2002).
One example would be that consumers have a tendency to avoid firms which change
prices often and by a large amount, deterring firms from changing price more fre-
quently. As a result, an optimal price adjustment should balance benefits of setting
the optimal price and losses of changing the price more often, which then answers the
second question as to when firms adjust price.
My paper studies the price adjustment under the discrete adjustment perspective.
A recent empirical paper by Zbaracki, Ritson, Levy, Dutta & Bergen (2004) expands
the concept of menu cost by adding managerial costs and other types of consumer
costs. Empirical papers based on the “uncertainty of response” explanation have
primarily focused on examining the macro-factors such as inflation or variables re-
lating to firms’ production function (wage and capacity) (Eden (2001); Lein (2010)).
However, there are few empirical studies that explore price changes from a micro-
focus. Under this scope, several micro-theories naturally come to surface. The price
adjustment could be due to price discrimination, a strategic response to a change in
competitors’ action, or the adjustment could simply be a reflection of falling marginal
cost. This study is not yet ready is not yet ready to test different theories, but instead
it is meant to be an early descriptive contribution about the discreteness of price ad-
justment and, in particular, add some preliminary evidence to the “uncertainty of
response” explanation.
The model construction and estimation follow a discrete-time survival analysis
method similar to Allison (1982); Jenkins (2005). I find that a high-quality product
tends to adjust price more often than a low-quality one. Older products are more likely
to change price than newer ones. Conditional on the quality and age of a product,
each manufacturer follows a different pricing process; however, all manufacturers’
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processes are more responsive to seasonal effects than market competition.
Finally, I bring some new evidence to the literature on the topic of cost pass-
through. An attractive point of the data is that I observe both retail prices and
wholesale prices directly, so I can study the pass-through in both timing and sizing.
Of the two subjects, the size of pass-through is much more developed than the timing.
A recent theoretical paper by Weyl & Fabinger (2013) provides a general framework
for examining cost pass-through and uses it to study the tax incidence under imperfect
competition. Gron & Swenson (2000) explore a reduced-form estimation and analyze
the pass-through rate in the U.S. automobile market. Kim & Cotterill (2008) further
explore this issue under a structural model. However, no literature has studied the
speed of pass-through before. Previous work gets around this issue by more or less
assuming that the pass-through is immediate. Results in this paper, however, show
a quite different story. Not only is the speed far from immediate, but it also varies
greatly across products. Thus, it raises new questions for the literature as to why
retail prices do not adjust immediately and why some adjust quicker than others?
At the current stage, I do not have enough data to evaluate different mechanisms.
Nevertheless, documenting the significant lags is important unto itself. Without fur-
ther theoretical guidance, I make a first attempt to bring some descriptive evidence
to these newly arisen questions. A possible application for the speed of pass-through
can be used together with pass-through rate to better infer market competition. For
example, if retail price changes respond more quickly over wholesale price changes
together with a higher pass-through rate provide strong evidence for a more compet-
itive market. The estimation of the size of pass-through uses a simple logit-linear
model introduced by Kim & Cotterill (2008). Although a structural model has the
advantage of comparing pricing theories, its use will not be necessary in this case
because I assume a Bertrand-Nash pricing model. The results show that wholesale
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prices pass-through is significant both in speed and size. The probability of a retail
price change is 130% more likely after a change in its associated wholesale price. The
cost pass-through elasticity equals 0.6, indicating the degree of competition in China’s
wireless market is relatively low and closer to a monopoly.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents and describes data,
Section 3 constructs the empirical model and discusses the estimation method, Section
4 discusses the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Data
The data consist of price information of 121 unique smartphone models from 21
manufacturers between August 2010 and May 2013. They are obtained from China
Unicom, the second largest wireless carrier in China. The are two prices, retail price
and wholesale price, that are associated with a model in each month. With these
data, I am able to identify an entry and exit time for each model and the time that
price adjustment happens for each model.1 The data also have the sales information,
which enable me to construct consumers holding share – the share of population that
has purchased a smartphone from China Unicom.2 On top of these, I also include
other variables that reflect additional information on both product level and market
level. For the product level information, a measure of model quality is obtained using
the flow utility of a model, which value is previously computed in my other paper
1I observe multiple wholesale price changes throughout the data period. However, it is not clear
whether it is the outcome of manufacturers’ desire change frequency or the result of being restricted
by the contract they sign. Given that I do not have access to the details of the contracts they sign
with retailers, and if there exists such a restriction on price change frequency, the estimates would
be biased downwards.
2Given the durability of a smartphone and the time length of the data, I assume that consumers
only purchase once in a lifetime. Therefore, the consumers holding share at the beginning of time
t + 1 can be directly computed using the sales data, which is the share that has not already made
a purchase minus the total shares sold in time t. The value of consumer holding share at time 1 is
set equal to 1, assuming everyone starts with holding the outside options.
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Yu (2014).3 Using the same value, I am able to construct the averages of product
quality on both firm level and market level. These variables together comprise the
set of state-dependent variables. A summary of these variables is presented in table
(3.1).
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Min Max
Model quality −0.16 0.07 −0.39 0.02
Age 4.92 5.06 0 32
Firm average quality −0.13 0.08 −0.39 0.00
Firm model counts 2.13 1.71 1 8
Market average quality −0.16 0.06 −0.3 0.09
Market model counts 26.5 8.5 8 42
Consumer holding shares 0.96 0.02 0.92 1
Wholesale Price Adjustment (50/121)
Price adjustment per model 0.5 0.7 0 3
Time before first adjustment 4.5 3.05 1 14
Time between 1st and 2nd adjustment (8/50) 7.88 3.18 3 12
Adjustment volume (RMB) −176 143.27 −919 47
Retail Price Adjustment (32/121)
Price adjustment per model 0.3 0.53 0 2
Time before first adjustment 5.93 6.44 1 28
Time between 1st and 2nd adjustment (4/32) 13.25 10.03 3 26
Adjustment volume (RMB) −202 781.75 −2, 446 996
Retail Response to Wholesale Adjustment
Time after 1st wholesale adjustment 1.5 8.5 −10 24
Num. wholesale adjustment 1.05 0.99 0 3
Age is a time-varying variable that denotes the time between the entry of a model
and the current time, a measure of the length of a model being in the market. Due
3To be more precise, the value computed in the paper Yu (2014) is the monthly flow utility of
holding a “model+network” bundle, such that a smartphone model is sold through a bundle contract
combining the model and network service. Given that I use the entry level of network service for all
models, the utility of a bundle is a monotonic transformation of the model utility, and thereby can
be used as a approximation for the utility of a model.
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to the data length, age for models that were released in the later data period are
truncated and thereby is an underestimation for the true length. With the quality
of outside option being set as zero, the negative value of quality simply reflects the
fact that major populations choose outside options over a model in the market. Firm
model counts and market model counts measure the number of models that is in a firm
or in the market at a certain time. There are total of 121 unique smartphone models
during the data period. Of the 121 models, 50 models did change wholesale price at
least once, and 8 out of those 50 models adjusted the wholesale price more than once.
Compared to wholesale price adjustment, retail price did not adjust as much, only
32 out of 121 models changed price over the three-year course. With that said, retail
price does not adjust as often as wholesale price. The last row in table (3.1) gives
us a closer look. It records the number of wholesale price adjustments before a retail
price change took place. On average, it takes about two wholesale price adjustments
for a retail price change to happen. Time-wise, there is approximately a two-periods
lag between the first retail price change and the first wholesale price change. Note
that a negative time value means that sometimes the first retail price change takes
place even before a wholesale price change.
As for the adjustment volume, all the adjustments for wholesale prices are mark-
downs except one, ranging from roughly 100 RMB to about 1000 RMB. Retail price,
on the other hand, display more volatility in both volume and sign. Of all the retail
price adjustments, 36% are price increases and the range is twice as great as the range
for wholesale price. A retail price consists of three parts: bundle list price, monthly
access fee and contract length. Any changes in one of the three components leads
to a change in the retail price. However, a change in the latter two results in an
accumulative effect and, thus, a bigger change than a one-time change in the bundle
list price.
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Figure 3.1: Wholesale Price Over Time
Figure 3.2: Demeaned Wholesale Price Over Age
Figure 3.1 displays wholesale prices over time. The dots denote the wholesale price
for a model in a given time; the solid line represents the conditional mean of wholesale
prices over time; and the surrounding gray area denotes the 95% confidence interval
of the mean. The downward-sloping conditional mean shows that wholesale prices
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are decreasing over time, from an average around 1, 900 RMB to around 1, 200 RMB.
However, the graph of wholesale prices over age (figure 3.2) shows a completely oppo-
site pattern. To avoid time effects confounding the results, I use demeaned wholesale
prices in figure 3.2.4 There are several reasons that price might fall over time: one
is intertemporal price discrimination; another is improvement of rival products; and
another is exogenous falling costs. Of the three reasons, the second and the third
are fairly intuitive. To explain a little more about the first reason, a monopoly of a
durable good would charge a higher price at the beginning for those that have a higher
willingness to pay, and gradually drop prices as those that have not yet purchased are
more price sensitive than those that purchased already. An upward trend of whole-
sale prices over age seems counterintuitive. One possible explanation could be that
age variable captures information about model quality that is observed to firms but
not to consumers, and we would expect the upward trend to flip after controlling for
model effects. An alternative explanation could be that the model characteristic is
not observed to both consumers and firms, so that firms will raise the price if the
model turns out to be high quality and continue selling it a for longer time. Further
examination is conducted in the section of empirical results.
Table (3.2) further breaks the model quality into manufacturer level. Manufac-
turers are listed from top to bottom based on the average quality from high to low.
Of the 21 manufacturers, Apple, Coolpad, Lenovo, Samsung, Huawei and ZTE are
the six manufacturers with the highest market shares. Their product sets are also the
largest except for Apple. Apple ranks as the highest of the six biggest manufacturers
and the second highest of all manufacturers. The ranking shows that, overall, the six
manufacturers are overall well spread over the quality line, indicating their products
4Given that wholesale prices are dropping over time, the upward trend of wholesale prices over
age with time effects should be more steeper than without. For the graph that is with time effects,
see Appendix figure 4.4.
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Table 3.2: Model Quality by Manufacturer
Rank Manufacturer Num. models Quality Std.
1 Meizu 1 −0.09 0
2 Apple∗ 5 −0.09 0.06
3 HTC 3 −0.10 0.01
4 Xiaomi 6 −0.11 0.04
5 Coolpad∗ 15 −0.14 0.04
6 Hair 1 −0.14 0
7 Gionee 2 −0.14 0
8 Lenovo∗ 14 −0.15 0.05
9 Hisense 4 −0.15 0.02
10 Philips 1 −0.15 0
11 Malata 1 −0.15 0
12 Samsung∗ 17 −0.16 0.07
13 Changhong 1 −0.16 0
14 Huawei∗ 14 −0.17 0.05
15 ZTE∗ 11 −0.17 0.07
16 Amoi 1 −0.18 0
17 Motorola 5 −0.18 0.06
18 Ktouch 7 −0.19 0.06
19 Nokia 7 −0.21 0.05
20 Sony Ericsson 5 −0.24 0.04
21 LG 1 −0.25 0
Notes : The asterisk mark ∗ denotes the manufacturer is one of the
biggest six firms market share wise.
are differentiated, each focusing a distinct group of consumers. Manufacturers with
a lower standard error indicates their products fall in the similar range of quality,
where as a higher standard error suggests qualities of products being further apart.
For example, Coolpad’s smartphone models are similar to each other in quality and
are all relatively high-end. To the contrary, Samsung has the most product variety.
The quality of a Samsung Galaxy is -0.04, while for a Samsung I6500 model is only
-0.29.
Table (3.3) shows the number of models that have wholesale prices changed in
each of the of the following months (column 1). The survival rates associated with
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each month is estimated using Kaplan-Meier non-parametric method. Of the 121
cases, 61 models did not change the wholesale prices during the observation period,
thereby they are considered censored. The first column is the duration time before
a price adjustment occurs. As models enter and exit the market frequently during
the observation period, the starting point for a model is set as the first month of
the model in market. For example, month 3 means price adjustment occurs in the
third month of the model being in the market. The second column gives the number
of models that are at risk of price adjustment in each of those months.5 The third
column gives the number of price adjustments occurring in the associated month. It
shows that manufacturers are most likely to change the wholesale price of a model
between the second and the fifth month if they are to change the wholesale price of
that model at least once. More than 60% of the events throughout the observation
period happen during this time. All the wholesale price adjustments happen within
the first 14 months. The fourth and fifth column show the survival rate in each of
the months – the share of the models that has not already adjusted price at the given
month and its associated stand errors.
Figure (3.3) shows the hazard rate of the wholesale price adjustment, which is
the probability for a model to have a wholesale price adjustment at a given month
if it has not already adjusted the wholesale price. Although the survival rate dimin-
ishes consistently over time, the hazard rate varies from time to time. Overall, the
hazard rate is upward trending, indicating the conditional probability to have a price
adjustment is increasing with time. However, what is not so clear is curvature of the
curve, in other words, the speed of the probability increase. The full sample suggests
a convex shape, but the steep slope at the end is mostly driven by the three extreme
5Models that have changed price once could change price again, but the results in table (3.3) are
restricted only to the first price adjustment. The analysis for a model to have multiple adjustments
is discussed in Section 3.
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Table 3.3: Distribution of Month of Wholesale Price Adjustment
Month Num. at risk Num. of events Survival rate Std. error
1 121 4 0.97 0.02
2 108 11 0.87 0.03
3 86 12 0.75 0.04
4 65 7 0.56 0.05
5 51 8 0.57 0.06
6 37 5 0.49 0.06
7 24 4 0.41 0.06
8 18 1 0.38 0.06
9 13 3 0.29 0.06
10 9 2 0.23 0.06
11 6 1 0.20 0.06
12 5 1 0.15 0.06
14 3 2 0.05 0.04
Figure 3.3: Hazard Rate of Wholesale Price Adjustment
values on the right tail. Once the extreme values are excluded, the increase is more
moderate and the trend is more linear. Note that the calculations for the hazard
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rate up to this point is under the assumption that hazard rate is the same for all
models a certain time. In other words, it assumes hazard rate does not depend on
any explanatory variables other than time. In the next section, I will turn to models
that allow hazard rate to depend on explanatory variables.
Next is to relax this assumption a little by exploring whether hazard rate is differ-
ent between groups. Figure (3.4) presents the non-parametric survival rate estimates
by group. Here, I consider two definitions of group: the top graph compares such
estimates between big firms and fringe firms;6 the bottom one compares the estimate
between high-end model and low-end model.
As shown in the top graph, the survival rate for big firms is lower in the early
period. However, the rates flip in the later period, as the survival rate for big firms
becomes slightly higher than the fringe firms after time 8. This pattern suggests that
big firms tend to adjust prices more often in the early periods, whereas fringe firm are
more active on price adjustment in the later periods. Overall, there is no clear pattern
indicating substantial difference in price adjustment process between big firms and
fringe firms. The bottom graph displays a clear gap in the survival rate between the
high-end model and low-end model. With survival rate for high-end constantly lower
than the rate for low-end, it shows that the high-end model has an overall higher
probability of price adjustment occurrence, yielding a lower duration period. This
could potentially reflect the dynamics of competition in the market. There are very
few substitutes for a high-end model when it was first released, giving firm the power
to charge a high markup. Such a markup will gradually diminish as new models with
better configurations enter the market over time. On the contrary, a low-end model
faces high competition since the beginning, urging firm to charge a low markup and
6The average shares of these six biggest manufacturers together take up to 85% of the total
bundle sales per period.
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Figure 3.4: Survival Rate Estimates by Group
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leaving the firm with limited space for price adjustment.
3.3 Model and Estimation
3.3.1 Discrete-Time Survival Model
In this section, I construct a survival analysis model of the hazard rate, the probability
of a price adjustment for a model in time t given that price has not adjusted yet before
t (t = 1, 2, . . . ), as a function of time-dependence variables and state-dependence
variables. Given that the time unit is in months, it is more appropriate to use the
discrete-time model (Allison (1982)) rather than the continuous-time model. Similar
to continuous-time model, I assume that there are n independent individuals (i =
1, 2, . . . , n). Each i begins at some starting point t = 1 and continues until some
point ti, when either an event happens or the observation is censored. In my case,
each individual i is a smartphone model, and I have n = 121 models in total. At
time ti, either there is a price adjustment occurs for model i or the model is censored,
meaning ti would be the last period of model i in data. To be more specific, a censored
model is when the model drops off the market before a price adjustment happens. Let
T be the random variable that denotes the uncensored time of an event occurrence,
I now define the hazard rate λi(t), the conditional probability of a price adjustment
for model i happens at time t given that it has not already happened, that carries
the following form,
λit = Pr[ Ti = t | Ti ≥ t, xit], (3.1)
where xit denotes a 1×K vector of explanatory variables, which can take on different
values across models and at a different discrete time unit. Next, to specify how does
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hazard rate depend on time and the explanatory variables, I use the logit regression
such that
λit = 1/[ 1 + exp(−αt − xitβ)], (3.2)
where αt and β are coefficients to be estimated. Depending on the assumption of the
shape of the hazard function, αt can take different function forms. The same applies
to coefficient β, depending on whether to allow the effect of the explanatory variables
to be time-varying. Here, I assume the effect of explanatory variables to be constant
over time, thereby βk, k = 1, 2, . . . , K is just a constant number to be estimated.
However, I consider several special cases of αt,
αt =

α
α0 + α1t
α0 + α1 log(t)
(3.3)
The first equation imposes the restriction on hazard rate to be time independent;
the other two allow more flexible forms of hazard rate as a function of time.
3.3.2 Estimation
The estimation of the logit model uses maximum likelihood (ML) method. Set δi
equal to 1 if i is not censored and zero otherwise, the general form of a likelihood
equation for censored discrete-time data can be obtained as,
L =
n∏
i=1
Pr(Ti = ti)
δi Pr(Tt > ti)
1−δi . (3.4)
101
Applying properties of conditional probabilities, I can rewrite the probabilities in
equation (3.4) as functions of the hazard rate only,
Pr(Ti = ti) = λit
t−1∏
τ=1
(1− λiτ )
Pr(Tt > ti) =
t∏
τ=1
(1− λiτ ) (3.5)
Substituting equation (3.5) into equation (3.4), I can rewrite the likelihood equa-
tion in log form such as
logL =
n∑
i=1
δi log[λit/(1− λit)] +
n∑
i=1
ti∑
τ=1
log(1− λiτ ), (3.6)
and choose the optimal parameter α∗t and β
∗ that maximize equation (3.6).
In practice, I examine two types of events occurring. One is to impose restrictions
on the number of price adjustments per model, allowing each model to have no more
than one price adjustment. While this is the simplest way to begin, imposing such
a restriction put a lot of useful information to waste. As shown in the data, many
models experience multiple price adjustments throughout the time period, indicating
the importance to also consider the case of repeated events.
Single event per individual. The construction of observations for single event
of discrete-time model is to treat each discrete time unit for each model as a separate
observation until the first event happens. For example, the dependent variable will
be coded as 1 if the first price adjustment happens at time t, and ones that occur
before t are coded as zero. If model i has the first price adjustment at time t = 3,
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three observations are created with the first two as zero and the last one as 1. The
explanatory variables for these new observations are assigned values of whatever
they have at that particular time unit. For the observations that are later than the
time of first price adjustment, simply drop off from data.
Repeated events per individual. In this particular case, the construction of
observations is similar to the single event. In addition, I will also make use of all the
following price adjustments for each model. A question that comes naturally with
this set up is what would be the time to set as the starting point for the following
adjustments. Similar to the way that Allison (1982) proposed, I treat each price
adjustment as a independent event, whether it is for the same model or not. For
example, if a model has adjusted price twice through its lifetime in the market, the
first one happens at time t = 3 and the second happens at time t = 7. The way to
construct observations for the price adjustment at time t = 3 is just the same as that
for single event. For the second adjustment, which is treated as a independent event,
the starting point is chosen as time t = 4, the period after t = 3. This will amount
to 4 observations for the second price adjustment, with the last one equal to 1 and
others are zeros. The explanatory variables are assigned accordingly the same way
as before. This method, however, is based on two underlying assumptions. One is
that it assumes the process of affecting the occurrence of the first price adjustment
is the same way for the second, third and later events. In other words, αk+1 =
αk, where k = 1, 2, . . . , K−1 denotes individual’s kth event. A further assumption is
that conditional on explanatory variables, the occurence of individual’s kth event is
independent from its previous histories. Of course, these assumptions do not always
hold true in reality, but for my case, this relatively simple method should be sufficient.
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3.4 Empirical Results
In this section, I present the empirical results of price adjustments in three contexts.
First, I examine the wholesale pricing process, considering it as a continuous choice
made by manufacturers in each time period. It is important to properly control
for possible correlations between unobserved product characteristics and regressors;
otherwise, it would lead to substantial bias of the estimates, both sign and magnitude.
Next, I examine the effect of determinants on the frequency of price adjustments,
a discrete choice of whether or not adjust the wholesale price at a given time. I
restrict my examination to the case of single price adjustment to begin with, and
then I test alternative specifications, allowing different time patterns for hazard rate,
heterogeneous seasonal and manufacturer effects. Then, I repeat the the whole set of
different specifications and estimate the case where a product can has multiple price
adjustments. In the first two contexts, I focus only on wholesale prices. Finally, I
move my focus to retail prices and examine the timing and sizing of pass-through
from wholesale price changes onto retail prices.
3.4.1 OLS Across-Product Pricing
To examine the across-product wholesale pricing policy adopted by manufacturers, I
run an OLS regression of wholesale prices on a number of explanatory variables. The
same set of explanatory variables will be used in the survival analysis later. Doing so
allows me to understand the similarities and differences between firms’ decisions on
setting prices and changing prices. I include the product quality and the number of
months a product has been in market (referred to as “Age”). I also include a dummy
variable indicating whether the model is the most updated of the manufacturer at the
time (referred to as “New model”). To capture the effect of competition from both
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within and across manufacturers, I use averages of product quality on both the firm
level and the market level. Finally, own shares and time trend are used to capture
the dynamic pattern of wholesale pricing over time, in which own shares denote the
share of population that has a “phone+network” bundle. The results are presented
in table 3.4.
Column (1) of table 3.4 reports the estimation results without controlling for any
fixed effects; column (2) and (3) report the results of adding model fixed effect and
adding both model and time fixed effects. The estimated effects of the variables are
mostly consistent with their predicted effects. Smartphone models of a newer ver-
sion and higher quality will have higher wholesale prices; brand (manufacturer)with
a higher average quality increases wholesale prices of all its products. Also, whole-
sale prices display a downward-sloping trend over time. However, it is surprising
to see that the estimates of age and own shares are both positive and significantly
different from zero. Given that I have not controlled for model effects, it is possible
some unobserved model characteristics – observed by consumers but not by econo-
metricians – are positively correlated with age and own shares. An example could
be the advertisement strategy, which is usually observable to consumers but not to
econometricians. Provided that everything else is constant, a heavily advertised new
high-end model becomes more popular as consumers gradually gain more familiarity,
which makes advertisement positively correlated with both age and own shares.
As expected, having controlled for model fixed effects, the coefficient of own shares
flips from positive to negative in column (2). The effect of model quality rises by more
than 50% once model fixed effects are included. To the opposite, the coefficients of
new model, brand average quality and time trend all drop in magnitude, comparing
to those in column (1). After controlling for model fixed effect, the coefficient of age,
however, is still positive and significant. It is possible that age is positively correlated
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Table 3.4: OLS Model of Across-Product Wholesale Pricing
Dep. var.: log(wholesale price)
(1) (2) (3)
Quality 10.22∗∗∗ 16.39∗∗∗ 16.22∗∗∗
(0.36) (1.56) (1.52)
Age 0.04∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
New Model 0.16∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
Brand avg. quality 0.70∗∗∗ 0.09∗ 0.09∗
(0.22) (0.04) (0.05)
Market avg. quality −1.42 −0.21 4.89∗∗∗
(1.73) (0.28) (1.72)
Own shares 59.85∗∗∗ −4.95∗∗∗ −49.71∗∗∗
(11.58) (1.91) (7.92)
Time −0.20∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02)
Constant 9.96∗∗∗ 11.52∗∗∗ 12.69∗∗∗
(0.55) (0.58) (0.74)
Model F.E. Yes Yes
Month F.E. Yes
Observations 833 835 836
Adjusted R2 0.60 0.99 0.99
Residual Std. Error 0.42 (df = 825) 0.06 (df = 707) 0.05 (df = 676)
F Statistic 182.18∗∗∗ 936.86∗∗∗ 792.82∗∗∗
(df = 7; 825) (df = 125; 707) (df = 156; 676)
Notes: ∗p < 0.1;∗∗ p < 0.05;∗∗∗ p < 0.01
with some time-specific demand shock that is common to all products and cannot be
fully captured by a linear time trend. For example, firms usually pick a best-selling
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season to release their new products and would collectively change their prices at a
certain time of a year.
To control for this, column (3) further adds time fixed effects. Notice the time
trend estimate drops out due to perfect colinearity. Results in column (3) are overall
similar to those reported in column (2) except that the negative effect of own share
becomes greater and the coefficient of market average quality becomes positive and
significant. The estimate of age is consistently positive across all columns. This
implies what we expect to see – price falling with age – is an artifact; rather, prices
go up with time. An alternative explanation might be that upon introduction, quality
is unknown both to the consumers and the retailer. If a product is revealed to be
popular, the retailer raises price and keeps selling it for longer, so that the age variable
is capturing something about the revealed unobserved quality.
3.4.2 Logit Within-Product Price Adjustment
Now, let us move to the within-product price adjustment. Here I consider two different
cases: single event and repeated events. Recall that the single event examines the
price adjustment process that is limited to the first adjustment of a smartphone model,
where as repeated events case include all price adjustments of a model. Due to the
different data censoring processes, single event data amounts to 579 observations and
the repeated events data amounts to 619 observations. Accordingly, the dependent
variable in single event denotes whether the first price adjustment occurs at a certain
time; while in the repeated events, it simply denotes whether a first price adjustment
occurs at a certain time. In both cases, I further break it down into five specifications.
Columns (1) to (3) test which model describes the shape of the hazard rate the
best, assuming constant, linear time trend and time trend in log form, respectively.
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Column (4) adds more time-dependent variables such as quarter dummies.7 The last
column includes manufacturer dummies, aiming to test whether manufacturers follow
different price adjustment processes. For the variable that represents quality, instead
of using the continuous value as I did with across-product pricing, I create a category
factor variable, with values being set as 1 to 4 corresponding to the first to the fourth
quantile of quality. Results are presented in table (3.5) and table (3.6).
Of columns (1) to (3), the Chi-square statistic and the associated degree of freedom
suggest the log form of time trend (column (3)) fits the data the best, and this is
true in both single and repeated events scenarios. Before interpreting the coefficients,
note that the dependent variable is the hazard rate of price change, so an increase in
the hazard rate which is caused by a positive coefficient is equivalent to a decrease
in the duration, indicating a higher chance for price adjustment to happen. On the
other hand, negative coefficients mean lower hazard rate, longer duration, and lesser
likelihood to have a price adjustment.
First of all, in the single event, the quantile dummies for quality– denoted as
“2nd qu” to “4th qu”–show that models with higher quality tend to change price
more often than models with lower quality; however, the probability is not linearly
increasing with quality. Furthermore, models from the third and forth quantile have
significantly higher probability of a price change than the first two quantiles. In
particular, the probability of a price change reaches the highest in the third quantile,
not the fourth, and is roughly 11 times higher than a first quantile model, three times
higher than a second quantile model and about twice as high as a model from the
fourth quantile. Intuitively, a high-end model usually faces with fewr rival products
7In alternative settings, I also test by adding year dummies or month dummies. Having controlled
for quarter dummies, none of the coefficients of year dummies are significant. In the model with
month dummies only, most of the coefficients of the month dummies are not significant. The tables
are not reported here.
108
Table 3.5: Within-Product Wholesale Price Adjustment : Single Event
Dep. var.: λit Model: Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age 0.28∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.24∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
2nd qu 1.54∗∗∗ 1.53∗∗∗ 1.59∗∗∗ 1.56∗∗∗ 2.33∗∗∗
(0.55) (0.56) (0.56) (0.58) (0.66)
3rd qu 2.92∗∗∗ 2.70∗∗∗ 2.89∗∗∗ 2.83∗∗∗ 3.78∗∗∗
(0.72) (0.74) (0.73) (0.74) (0.88)
4th qu 2.04∗∗∗ 1.97∗∗ 2.17∗∗∗ 2.18∗∗∗ 3.28∗∗∗
(0.76) (0.77) (0.78) (0.80) (0.95)
New Model −0.82∗∗ −0.89∗∗ −0.93∗∗∗ −0.92∗∗ −0.57
(0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.37) (0.42)
Model counts 0.01 0.09∗ 0.09∗ 0.13∗∗ 0.10∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Own shares 0.11 3.66∗∗ 1.24∗∗ 1.37∗∗ 1.25∗∗
(0.19) (1.68) (0.56) (0.57) (0.57)
Time 0.79∗∗
(0.37)
Log(time) 3.56∗∗ 3.76∗∗ 3.21∗
(1.75) (1.76) (1.80)
Quat2 0.98∗
(0.51)
Quat3 0.46
(0.66)
Quat4 1.03∗∗
(0.51)
Coolpad 0.16
(0.59)
Huawei 0.94∗
(0.57)
Apple −1.01
(0.93)
Lenovo 0.68
(0.55)
Samsung 0.66
(0.57)
ZTE 1.60∗∗
(0.63)
Constant −15.57 −374.43∗∗ −136.30∗∗ −151.08∗∗ −138.37∗∗
(19.33) (169.96) (59.84) (60.77) (61.09)
Observations 579 579 579 579 579
Log Likelihood -144.33 -141.52 -141.11 -138.06 -136.60
Chi-square(D.F.) 288.67(571) 283.04(570) 282.21(570) 276.11(567) 273.19(564)
Notes: ∗p < 0.1;∗∗ p < 0.05;∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3.6: Within-Product Wholesale Price Adjustment : Repeated Event
Dep. var.: λit Model: Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Adjusted once before 1.20∗∗ 1.10∗∗ 1.05∗∗ 1.06∗∗ 0.48
(0.52) (0.51) (0.51) (0.52) (0.59)
Adjusted twice before 0.16 0.08 −0.08 0.02 −0.05
(1.00) (0.98) (0.98) (1.00) (1.11)
Time after last change 0.34∗∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08)
2nd qu 1.49∗∗∗ 1.48∗∗∗ 1.52∗∗∗ 1.45∗∗∗ 2.36∗∗∗
(0.53) (0.55) (0.55) (0.56) (0.64)
3rd qu 3.03∗∗∗ 2.83∗∗∗ 3.00∗∗∗ 2.91∗∗∗ 4.40∗∗∗
(0.69) (0.70) (0.70) (0.71) (0.90)
4th qu 2.08∗∗∗ 2.01∗∗∗ 2.19∗∗∗ 2.14∗∗∗ 3.84∗∗∗
(0.71) (0.72) (0.73) (0.74) (0.95)
New model −0.63∗ −0.67∗∗ −0.71∗∗ −0.71∗∗ −0.28
(0.33) (0.33) (0.34) (0.35) (0.40)
Model counts 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Own shares 0.06 3.12∗ 0.95∗ 1.05∗ 1.08∗∗
(0.18) (1.64) (0.53) (0.54) (0.54)
Time 0.69∗
(0.37)
Log(time) 2.86∗ 3.08∗ 2.42
(1.68) (1.74) (1.70)
Quat2 0.90∗
(0.47)
Quat3 0.25
(0.61)
Quat4 0.98∗∗
(0.49)
Coolpad 0.15
(0.59)
Huawei 1.18∗∗
(0.56)
Apple −1.37∗
(0.82)
Lenovo 0.71
(0.55)
Samsung 0.77
(0.54)
ZTE 1.54∗∗
(0.61)
Constant −11.19 −320.89∗ −105.91∗ −118.20∗∗ −120.28∗∗
(18.05) (166.04) (56.64) (57.98) (57.94)
Observations 619 619 619 619 619
Log Likelihood -157.00 -154.90 -154.91 -151.47 -148.73
Chi-square (D.F.) 314(609) 309.8(608) 309.8(608) 302.9(605) 297.5(602)
Notes: ∗p < 0.1;∗∗ p < 0.05;∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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when it first enters the market. The lack of substitutability enables the manufacturer
to charge a high markup for the product. As new models with better quality enter the
market from time to time, it pushes the manufacturer to mark down the price for the
older models accordingly. On the contrary, a low-end model faces high competition
since its birth, driving the price to be close to the marginal cost. This leaves the
manufacturer with little space for further price reduction.
The effect of age is positive and significant, suggesting older models are more
likely to change prices than newer ones. To be specific, a model that is one month
older is 27% more likely to change its price. Also, the odds for the most updated
model in a manufacturer’s product set to have a price adjustment is about 55% lower
than the other models in the same product set. A measure for market competition –
model counts – shows less significance and much smaller magnitude when compared to
other explanatory variables. This is within expectations given that I already control
for quality and new model, as both variables partially reflect the market competition.
Consumer holding shares significantly increases the probability of price adjustment
for all models in the market, a 1% increase in the population holdings share would
double the chance of a price change for all products in market.8
On top of the common explanatory variables, column (4) adds quarter time dum-
mies to see how the hazard rate varies by seasons. The results show a clear seasonal
pattern, with significantly higher chance of a price change in the second and the
fourth quarter of a year in the first quarter. The three biggest national holidays in
China are the Spring Festival, Labor day and the National day, which fall in the first,
second and fourth quarters respectively. As expected, the third quarter coefficient
8I also test a specification where hazard rate is allowed to be different every month. In practice,
these are captured by the time dummies. Almost all the time dummies in the regression are insignif-
icant, and the Chi-square shows the fitness of model is no different from the one with time trend.
The regression table is not reported here.
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does not stand out, yet it is not clear what factor makes it less likely for the first
quarter to have a price adjustment than the other two quarters. Finally, column (5)
suggests manufacturers follow different paths of price processes, holding quality and
everything else constant. Huawei, Samsung and ZTE are more likely to adjustment
price than other manufacturers. On the contrary, Apple is 70% less likely to adjust
its wholesale price. In columns (4) and (5), adding the quarter and manufacturer
fixed effects do not alter the magnitudes or the significances for other explanatory
variables.
Table (3.6) presents the results from a similar regression setting to table (3.5) ex-
cept the dependent variable is replaced with whether the model experiences a whole-
sale price change in a given month. Accordingly, the age variable is replaced by the
time since the last price adjustment. In addition, I add a dummy variable denot-
ing the number of price changes that have happened before. Accordingly, “Adjusted
once before” means that there has been one price change before the current time, and
“twice” stands for two price changes. The remaining variable settings are the same
as in the single event.
Overall, the estimates show a similar story as presented in the single event, though
with some differences in magnitudes. The first price change significantly increases the
probability of a second price change, by roughly doubling the probability. The second
price change does not have significant effect on future price adjustments. Moreover,
the coefficient of the number of previous price changes becomes insignificant once
including the manufacturer dummy variable, indicating that the number of price
changes is manufacturer specific. The time after last adjustment has a greater impact
on the probability of a price change in the repeated events than the single event. The
impact of a new model drops in the repeated events. Usually by the time of the second
price change, the model is no longer the most updated within the manufacturer. With
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that being said, the most updated model has more impact on the occurrence of the
first adjustment, and less so for the later adjustments. Allowing the effects of high-end
model introductions to last for more than one price adjustment, the third and fourth
quantile quality dummies show stronger impact in the repeated events. In particular,
the probability of a third quarter quality model having a price change is doubled in
the repeated events. This further confirms with the argument that price is likely to
adjust more often for the high-end model as the markup gradually eroded upon more
advanced models entering the market. Thus, it is not surprising to see the market
competition factor (model counts) drop in significance, given that it is possible the
quality dummies suffice to reflect the competition from rival products. Finally, the
seasonal and manufacturer fixed effects show similar patterns to the effects in the
single event.
3.4.3 The Effect of Wholesale Price on Retail Price
In this section, I examine the extent to which retail price changes are explained by
wholesale prices. I am particularly interested in the cost pass-through from wholesale
prices onto retail prices. The advantage of studying the process of change in retail
price over wholesale price is that I observe wholesale price directly, so I can study the
pass-through in both timing and sizing.
Regarding the pass-through topic, both theoretical and empirical studies have
restricted their focuses solely on explaining the size of pass-through. However, no
literature has studied the speed of the pass-through before. Previous work gets around
this issue by more or less assuming the pass-through would be immediate. However,
what we see in table 3.1 is that the opposite is true. Not only is the speed of pass-
through far from immediate, as it would take an average of two time periods before
retail price changes take place, it also varies greatly between products. Some products
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adjust before a wholesale price change, whereas others do not adjust until two years
later. So far, we have no theory to guide us on this issue other than some sense of
menu costs. Borrowing the idea from the theory of discrete price adjustment, another
possible explanation is the uncertainty of response by consumers and competitors.
Just as in the intermediate market of manufacturers, retailers in the final market are
constantly competing with rivals over market shares. Thus, before a price adjustment
decision is made, retailers have to take into account the possible strategic reaction his
rival might take and then consumers’ response accordingly. For example, if a retailer
observes a rise in a rival’s wholesale price, expecting rival’s retail price would raise
accordingly, the best strategy for the retailer is to not raise his retail price. Under a
symmetric equilibrium, the market outcome is that no retailer will change its retail
price. In the opposite case of a drop in wholesale price, it might lead to an outcome
where all the retailers reduce retail prices, even for those whose wholesale prices have
not changed.
However, the two explanations above only shed some light on why retail prices
do not adjust immediately. It offers no explanation to the heterogeneity of the pass-
through speed, or why some retail prices response quicker than others? This undevel-
oped subject is worth studying if more data are obtained. In the current stage, I do
not have enough data to evaluate different mechanisms or enough to simultaneously
to study the speed and amount of pass-through. Even though, I think just document-
ing that there are significant lags is an important point unto itself, as it shows how
differently this plays out in practice from what we used to think. A possible appli-
cation for the speed of pass-through is that it can be used together with the size of
pass-through to better infer market competition. For example, a quicker response of
retail price changes over wholesale price changes together with a higher pass-through
rate provide stronger evidence for a more competitive market.
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Without further theoretical help, this section makes a first attempt to bring some
descriptive evidence to the “lagged pass-through” phenomenon. Also, the fact that
there is significant lag between wholesale price changes and retail price changes raises
the question of whether wholesale price changes can predict retail price changes. One
way to test it is to randomly distribute wholesale price changes across time periods
and rerun the baseline regression, and see if the results are substantially different
from those that generated by the baseline regression. The baseline regression, in this
case, posits on the same discrete-time survival model as the one in the wholesale price
adjustment earlier. The construction of the control variable set is based on retailers’
first-order condition. Here, I follow the assumption I made in my other paper, Yu
(2014), such that I assume away any retailer’s marginal costs other than the wholesale
price and the service cost as an promotion effort for manufacturers’ products.9 As a
result, retail price adjustment can be a reaction to one of the two sources: a change
in wholesale price or a change in service cost. In practice, the service that a retailer
provides for products does not vary within the manufacturer, but different between
manufacturers. Therefore, the inclusion of manufacturer fixed effects is sufficient to
capture the effect of service cost on the retail price adjustment. Furthermore, I add
quarter dummies and year dummies to control for time effects. Table 3.7 presents the
estimation results of within-product retail price adjustment.
Columns (1) to (4) in table 3.7 have the same layout as columns (2) to (5) in
table 3.6, where the first two columns test alternative hypothesizes of the shape of
the hazard rate and the next two columns allow for more flexibility in time effects and
manufacturer effect. Column (5) replaces the wholesale price changes with randomly
9Such an assumption is made for two reasons. First, the data source is limited; second the cost
associated with bundle sales is most likely incurred by the retailer on a store level rather than
on product level. An additive fixed fee to the profit function would not alter retailer’s first-order
condition.
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Table 3.7: The Timing of Retail Price Changes Over Wholesale price
Dep. var.: λit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Wholesale price adj. 0.88∗ 0.84∗ 1.10∗ 1.20∗∗
(0.48) (0.48) (0.57) (0.61)
Wholesale price adj. (random) 0.06
(0.81)
Time after last change 0.09∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Time 0.07∗∗∗ 0.45∗ 0.43∗ 0.49∗∗
(0.02) (0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Log(time) 1.11∗∗∗
(0.41)
Quat2 −19.22 −19.24 −19.14
(1, 218.97) (1, 214.31) (1, 236.71)
Quat3 −5.53∗∗∗ −5.62∗∗∗ −5.68∗∗∗
(1.85) (1.90) (1.87)
Quat4 −3.61 −3.58 −3.88∗
(2.20) (2.22) (2.21)
Year2011 −6.42∗∗ −6.20∗∗ −6.60∗∗
(3.02) (3.05) (3.04)
Year2012 −9.09 −8.62 −9.71∗
(5.72) (5.77) (5.73)
Year2013 −15.85∗ −15.18∗ −16.82∗
(8.63) (8.70) (8.64)
Constant −5.14∗∗∗ −6.77∗∗∗ −1.87 −1.52 −1.48
(0.62) (1.30) (1.40) (1.43) (1.42)
Manufacturer F.E. Yes Yes
Observations 730 730 730 730 730
Log Likelihood -131.32 -132.58 -100.25 -97.96 -99.75
Chi-square(D.F.) 262.63(726) 265.16(726) 200.5(720) 195.91(714) 198.52(714)
Notes: ∗p < 0.1;∗∗ p < 0.05;∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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distributed wholesale price changes across time periods and tests whether wholesale
price changes predict retail price changes.
The coefficient of wholesale price adjustment shows that a change in wholesale
price significantly increases the price change probability of its associated retail price
by about 130%. Additionally, results from column (5) reject the null hypothesis that
wholesale price changes do not predict retail price changes. As shown, the coefficient
of randomly distributed wholesale changes drops both in magnitude and significance,
as long as other variables having similar results to the previous columns. It implies
that despite the heterogeneity of retail price changes over wholesale price changes,
wholesale price changes do predict retail price changes. On top of wholesale price
adjustment, the variable time after the last change captures a retailer’s own price
adjustment process. The coefficient, although significant, is of a much smaller impact
than that of wholesale price adjustment. Although the chi-square statistic shows that
the log of time fits data better than linear time trend, the upward tail seems to be
solely driven by two extreme values. After excluding them from the data, the increase
becomes much more mild and linear. For this reason, the results from columns (2)
to (5) are based on linear time trend. After including quarter and year effects, the
coefficient of wholesale price adjustment in column (4) rises from around 0.9 to 1.1;
however, F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal.
The coefficients of quarter dummies show the retail price’s adjustment pattern with
quarters of a year is the same as that of wholesale price, such that it is more likely to
have a price adjustment in the second and the fourth quarters and the less likely in
the first and third quarters. Having everything else constant, the coefficients show a
negative correlation between the hazard rate and year fixed effects. This could imply
that the retailer is gaining more knowledge of the market and consumers over time
and is able to better predict the market, so that he does not need to adjust retail price
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as frequently. Finally, adding manufacturer fixed effects does not alter the results nor
improve the fitness of the model.
Now let us move onto the size of pass-through, the proportion of a change in
wholesale prices is passed through to retail prices. Here, I use the method introduced
by Gron & Swenson (2000), a log-linear regression that obtains a unit-free measure
of the cost pass-through rate. The basic model is the following,
log(pit) = γ0i + γ1 log(wit) + t+ it, (3.7)
where log(pit) denotes the log of bundle retail price for product i in time t; log(wit)
denotes the log of model wholesale price for bundle i in time t; and it represents
the random error term. The coefficient γ1 denotes the pass-through elasticity. The
parameter γ0i is to capture the time-invariant manufacturer markup; while t captures
the time-varying component of the markup. The estimation results are shown in table
3.8.
Column (1) in table 3.8 provides the baseline estimation results, including only
the time-invariant manufacturer fixed effects and retailer margins. It is more likely
that manufacturers set wholesale markups based on model-specific attributes such
as market share and distinguishable characteristics. This introduces a correlation
between the model effects and the regressors, which violates the assumption of random
model effects. Therefore, it is more appropriate to use the model fixed effects instead
of the model random effects. Generally, however, it is also helpful to include retailer
fixed effects. The fact that I observe only one retailer in the data makes it trivial in
my case. Columns (2) and (3) further explore the robustness of the results by adding
time effects, in which column (2) adds a time trend and column (3) adds a month
fixed effect.
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Table 3.8: Log-Linear Model of Cost Pass-Through
Dep. var.: Log(retail price)
(1) (2) (3)
Log(wholesale price) 0.61∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Coolpad −0.01 −0.03 −0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Huawei −0.05∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.05∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Apple 0.09∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Lenovo −0.05∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Samsung 0.03∗∗ 0.02 0.03∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
ZTE −0.06∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗ −0.06∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 3.44∗∗∗ 3.21∗∗∗ 3.23∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Time 0.00∗∗∗
(0.00)
Month F.E. Yes
Observations 833 833 833
Adjusted R2 0.90 0.91 0.91
Residual Std. Error 0.15 (df = 825) 0.14 (df = 824) 0.14 (df = 792)
F Statistic 1,041.53∗∗∗ 996.97∗∗∗ 201.08∗∗∗
(df = 7; 825) (df = 8; 824) (df = 40; 792)
Notes: ∗p < 0.1;∗∗ p < 0.05;∗∗∗ p < 0.01
First, the pass-through elasticity is about 0.6, having controlled for manufacture
fixed effects. Theoretical models predict that with constant marginal cost, the pass-
through rate to be 1 under perfect competition and 0.5 if a firm is a monopolist
(Bulow & Pfleiderer (1983)). The estimate value falls between the two extreme val-
ues but is closer to 0.5, indicating the degree of competition in the wireless market
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is relatively low. The coefficients for manufacturer fixed effects are all significant
except for Coolpad, and are of mixed signs. This implies the retailer’s margins are
significantly different between manufacturers. Moreover, the fixed-effect coefficients
manufacturers with an average higher quality are lower than those of lower qualities.
As higher qualities are associated with higher wholesale price, the results could imply
that retailers charge a lower markup for the model that has a higher wholesale price.10
These results are consistent with the ones in Bulow & Pfleiderer (1983). In particular,
the bundles with Apple models have the highest wholesale prices and the lowest retail
markups; on the other hand, those with models from ZTE have the lowest wholesale
prices and the highest retail markups.
To further examine the robustness of the results, I add both time trend and month
fixed effects for time effects. The inclusion of time effects allows me to remove the
possible correlation between the change retail and wholesale price that is common
to all products. Overall, the estimates reported in column (2) and (3) are similar to
those that reported in column (1) except for slight changes in the magnitude of pass-
through elasticity and Apple fixed effect. F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis that
all three specifications have the same fitness. These imply that time-specific shocks
do not have a significant impact on pass-through elasticity.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper investigates firms’ price adjustment processes, with a particular focus
on the micro-level determinants of the frequency of the price changes. Using new
data containing wholesale prices from China Unicom, China’s second largest wireless
10The regression would be more compelling with model fixed effects. However, given the large
number of models in data, I would expect the pass-through elasticity to drop substantially in both
magnitude and significance. The testing results confirm my speculation. Once model fixed effects
are included, the pass-through elasticity drops from an average of 0.61 to 0.05 and is no longer
significant. If I further include month fixed effects, the coefficient drops to 0.01 and is insignificant.
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carrier, I construct and estimate a model of the frequency of price adjustments within
products. As an extension, the model is used to infer the pass-through of wholesale
price changes onto retail prices, both in timing and sizing.
First, I explore a simple reduced-form regression to predict prices. The results
show that without properly controlling for the correlations between unobserved prod-
uct characteristics and regressors, estimates will be substantially biased, both the
sign and magnitude. The consistent positive coefficient of age suggests that there are
unobserved product characteristics that might be unknown to both consumers and
retailers upon introduction, such that retailers will raise the price and keep selling
the product longer if it turns out to be of high-quality. As a result, the age variable
is capturing something about the revealed unobserved quality.
Next, the results from the discrete-time logit model reject the null hypothesis that
the probability of a price change is constant over time, but rather increases with time.
I find that the price of a high quality product tends to adjust more often, and the
probability is roughly six times higher than a low quality product.
Older products are more likely to change price than newer ones, and such an
effect is more substantial in the multiple price adjustments case. Also, firms follow
different price adjustment processes, in which Apple is the least likely to change
prices while Huawei and ZTE are the most likely of all manufacturers. Also, all firms
are more responsive to seasonal effects than to market competition. This could be
due to the fact that quality and other products’ feature describing variables already
partially reflected in the market competition; whereas a new smartphone model of
newer version with higher quality usually has fewer substitutes and, thus, faces less
competition.
Finally, the results of the speed of pass-through raise questions to the assumption
commonly made in literature that cost pass-through is immediate. The results show
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that not only is the speed of pass-through far from immediate, it also varies greatly
across products. Without further theoretical guidance, I use the same discrete-time
logit model to estimate the speed of pass-through, and find that wholesale price
changes significantly increases the probability of retail price changes by about 130%,
and such an effect is not random. As for the size of pass-through, the cost pass-
through elasticity coefficient equals 0.6, suggesting retailers absorb 40% of a unit
wholesale price increase. The value falls in between the theoretical predicted values
of the two extreme cases, which are 0.5 under a monopoly case and 1 under perfect
competition. The fact that the coefficient is closer to 0.5 indicates the degree of
competition in China’s wireless market is relatively low.
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APPENDIX
A.1 Micro-Moments
The idea of micro-moments is essentially to match the model predictions for the
attributes of consumers that purchase a new model to the counterpart observed in
the data. To form the sample moments, take the attribute of consumer being a city
resident for example, the population moment is,
E
[
z¯ − E [zi|y1j , θ2]] = 0,
where
z = 1{city} and y1j = 1{product j}
(4.1)
I cannot calculate the E
[
zi|y1j , θ2
]
exactly, however, it can be approximated using
“Bayes’ rule”:
E
[
zi|y1j , θ2
]
=
∫
z
zPr(dz|y1j , θ2) =
∫
z
∫
v
zPr(y1j |z, v, θ2)P (dv, dz)
Pr(y1j , θ2)
≈ 1
ns
1
sj
∑
r
zrPr(y
1
j |zr, vr, θ2, δi(θ2)),
(4.2)
where δi(θ2) is the utility level, given demand parameter θ2, that rationalizes the
observed market share sj. Then substitute (4.2) into (4.1) to obtain the sample
moments.
It is worth discussing the validity of the use of micro-data. All the data averages
attributes of consumers that purchase a new model are measurements on a nation-
wide basis, including all possible purchasing channels (three carriers and other model
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retailers). However, model predictions contain only one carrier: China Unicom. To
establish an apple-to-apple match, I need to drop off the signs of the effect of aver-
age attributes that are sensitive to different purchasing channels, since it is likely to
bias the corresponding micro-moments. I proceed with the filtering by first dividing
consumers into a carrier group and regular retailer group, the former preferring to
obtain the smartphone through a “phone+network” bundle from a carrier and the
other group preferring to get the smartphone and network service through separate
transactions. Then, I further divide the consumers in the carrier group into three
subgroups, each preferring his own carrier to the other two. Within each layer, I will
discuss whether the demographic variables, living area, age and education level would
affect some group in the opposite direction.
I start with the broader layer. Price and model are the two major factors that af-
fect consumers choice between bundle and the phone by itself: which has the desirable
model and which has the overall better price. With no doubt, a rational consumer
will pursue the channel that provides a cheaper price for his/her desired model, hence,
it is not likely that any of the demographic variables would have an opposite effect on
the consumers in either group. Moving on to the finer layer, groups that each prefer
a different carrier. If say one of the carriers, China Mobile, has better signal coverage
in rural area, which is likely to be true, then consumers that are rural residents would
prefer China Mobile to the other two carriers. This would lead to a sign flip between
China Mobile group and the other two groups. A minor concern arises from the var-
ious level of stickiness to the original carrier among age groups. China Mobile is the
oldest and also the largest carrier under the 2G network; the age structure of its 2G
subscribers skew towards the senior consumers relative to the other two carriers. If
the stickiness is increasing with age, then the effect of age on carrier choice for the
consumers in senior age group is likely to be positive for China Mobile and negative
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for the other two.
A.2 Derivations of matrix 4n, 4z and 4sz
This section provides the expressions for matrix 4c, $4sz, and components required
for 4p and 4z. In the following derivations, I omit all the time subscripts for simple
notations. To proceed, I start with market share response matrix with respect to
retail price 4c. This simply follows the routine described in Berry et al. (1995), such
that expression of element (j, q) in 4n is given by,
∂sq
∂pj
=

ns∑
i=1
gi αi sij (1− sij), if j = q;
−
ns∑
i=1
gi αi siq sij, if j 6= q,
(4.3)
where αi denotes consumers’ heterogeneous preferences over price with subscript i
representing each consumer type, and gi is the importance weight assigned to i.
Furthermore, the second order derivatives of market share with respect to price can
be derived as
∂2sq
∂pj∂pk
=

ns∑
i=1
gi αi
2 sij (1− sij) (1− 2sij), if j = q = k;
ns∑
i=1
gi αi
2 sij sik (2sik − 1), if j = q and q 6= k;
ns∑
i=1
gi αi
2 siq sij (2siq − 1), if j 6= q and q = k;
ns∑
i=1
gi αi
2 siq sij (2sij − 1), if j 6= q and j = k;
2
ns∑
i=1
gi αi
2 siq sij sik, otherwise.
(4.4)
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Matrix 4sz is the sales response matrix with respect to service. Define λ˜ =
Tc∑
τ=1
rτ−1 λ, which captures the service effect on discounted utility. Element (m, q) in
matrix 4sz is a row vector, with a length equal the number of products of manufac-
turer m, and its expression is given by
∂sq
∂zm
=

λ˜
ns∑
i=1
gi siq (1−
∑
k∈Jm
sik), if q ∈ Jm;
−λ˜
ns∑
i=1
gi siq(
∑
k∈Jm
sik), otherwise.
(4.5)
Together with Equation (4.3) and Equation (4.5), the expression for the second or-
der derivatives of market share with respect to price and service in κ(j, l) in Equation
(1.22), is shown as the following,
∂2sq
∂pj∂zl
=

λ˜
ns∑
i=1
gi αi sij(1− 2sij)(1−
∑
k∈Jl
sik), if j = q and {j, q} ⊂ Jl;
λ˜
ns∑
i=1
gi αi sij(2sij − 1)(
∑
k∈Jl
sik), if j = q and {j, q} 6⊂ Jl;
2λ˜
ns∑
i=1
gi αi sij siq (
∑
k∈Jl
sik − 1), if j 6= q and {j, q} ⊂ Jl;
λ˜
ns∑
i=1
gi αi siq sij (2
∑
k∈Jl
sik − 1), if j 6= q and j 6∈ Jl or q 6∈ Jl;
2λ˜
ns∑
i=1
gi αi siq sij (
∑
k∈Jl
sik), otherwise.
(4.6)
Given the market share response matrix to service, its second-order derivatives
can be derived for in (j, k), where {j, k} ⊂ JA, as,
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∂2sq
∂zm∂zl
=

λ˜2
ns∑
i=1
gi siq(1−
∑
k∈Jm
sik)(1− 2
∑
k∈Jm
sik), if q ∈ Jm and m = l;
λ˜2
ns∑
i=1
gi siq(
∑
k∈Jl
sik)(2
∑
k∈Jm
sik − 1), if q ∈ Jm and m 6= l;
λ˜2
ns∑
i=1
gi siq(
∑
k∈Jm
sik)(2
∑
k∈Jm
sik − 1), if q 6∈ Jm and m = l;
λ˜2
ns∑
i=1
gi siq(
∑
k∈Jm
sik)(2
∑
k∈Jl
sik − 1), if q ∈ Jl and m 6= l;
2λ˜2
ns∑
i=1
gi siq(
∑
k∈Jm
sik)(
∑
k∈Jl
sik), otherwise.
(4.7)
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A.3 Other Graphs and Tables
Figure 4.1: Prices over time (sales weighted averages)
Figure 4.2: Wholesale prices over time (sales weighted averages)
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Figure 4.3: Hazard Rate of Retail Price Adjustment
Figure 4.4: Hazard Rate of Retail Price Adjustment
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Table 4.2: Distribution of Month of Retail Price Adjustment
Month Num. at risk Num. of events Survival rate Std. error
1 121 6 0.95 0.02
2 106 4 0.92 0.03
3 91 4 0.87 0.03
4 78 5 0.82 0.04
5 63 2 0.79 0.04
6 51 3 0.75 0.05
7 37 2 0.71 0.05
9 25 1 0.68 0.06
11 18 1 0.64 0.07
12 14 1 0.59 0.07
19 4 1 0.45 0.14
23 2 1 0.22 0.17
28 1 1
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